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CHINA'S COMPANY LAW: PRACTICING CAPITALISM
IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY
Anna M. Hant
Abstract: As China embarks on the road to transform itself from a planned
economy to one in which market forces play an increasingly important part, the
corporation will play a critical role in this transformation. By outlining past and existing
economic policies, this article explores how these newly sanctioned corporations will
operate in China's changing economy and points outs some of the difficulties which the
Chinese will encounter. The article also recommends some steps necessary for the
Chinese economy to fully enjoy the benefits of efficiently operated corporations.
"Wandering between two worlds,
one dead, the other powerless to be born ...
from Matthew Arnold's Grand Chartreuse
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I. INTRODUCTION
As early as 1978, the People's Republic of China ("China")
recognized the inevitable death of the communist world and proceeded to
design an economic system to suit its unique characteristics and ensure its
political survival.' After years of isolation, China's desire to rejoin the
international market place and modernize prompted one of the boldest
economic experiments of our time.2 After the December 1978 meeting of
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, China embarked upon a course to convert its planned
socialist/communist economic system to a "socialist economic structure
with Chinese characteristics. ' 3 The most important features of China's new
I Mark B. Baker, Forgotten Legal China, 17 Hous. J. INT'L. 363, 365 (Spring 1995); see also Gary
Watson, Business Law in the People's Republic of China, 27 AM. BUS. L. J. 315-16 (1989).
2 Baker, supra note 1, at 365.
3 Also referred to as "socialism with Chinese characteristics," this phrase has become the key
slogan of Deng Xiao Ping's reform movement. The exact meaning of the phrase is hard to determine,
since it has been used to justify almost every change in China that does not comport with traditional
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design are its recognition of diverse forms of ownership, its opening of
China to foreign trade and investment, and its implementation of various
new laws to assist this transformation.
China's modernization began with the introduction of the laws
allowing foreign investment in China in the form of joint ventures, and
continued with other legislation designed to support this new economic
system.4 A significant development in this continuing series of economic
legislation is the promulgation of the COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, adopted December 29, 1993, effective June 1994
(hereinafter "the Company Law" or "the Law"). 5  The Company Law
promotes a fundamental change in the organizational structure of
enterprises in China. Unlike previous legislation, such as the joint venture
laws, which only covered foreign investment in China, the Company Law
potentially allows all domestic entities to operate under a market system.
7
For the first time since 1949, China now officially recognizes and
encourages the ownership of property by private individuals in addition to
ownership by the State and collectives. 8  If the Company Law is
socialist principles. For a good summary of the Chinese official view on China's new socialism, see Zhou
Shulian, Reform of the Economic Structure, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM, (George Totten & Zhou
Shulian eds., 1992). See also A. JAMES GREGOR, MARXISM, CHINA, & DEVELOPMENT (1995).
4 Many of the laws and regulations were directed at increasing foreign investment in China, a major
step towards this transformation, see generally, The Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-
foreign Joint Equity Ventures, reprinted in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 1 6-500 (1979); Economic
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 1 5-500
(1981); Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in China L. Foreign
Bus. (CCH Austl.) 5-550 (1985); Code of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in
China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 19-201 (1991); Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of
China Concerning Business Tax (Baker & McKenzie trans., 1993); Provisional Regulations of the People's
Republic of China Concerning Consumption Tax (Baker & McKenzie trans., 1993); Provisional
Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Value Added Tax (Baker & McKenzie trans.,
1993).
5 COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, reprinted in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH
Austl.) 9113-518 (1993) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW].
6 See The Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures, reprinted
in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 6-500 (1979), supra note 4.
7 Prior to the adoption of the Law, China allowed limited experimentation with local versions of
legislation which formed the basis of the present legislation. Some of the regulations are: Provisional
Regulations of the Shenzhen Municipality on Limited Liability Companies, issued May 18, 1992, by the
Shenzhen Municipal People's Government; Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality Concerning
Joint Stock Companies, issued May 18, 1992, by the Shanghai Municipal Government; and Guangdong
Company Regulations, issued May 4, 1993, by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government. Preston
M. Torbert, Broadening the Scope of Investment, CHINA BUS. REV., May 1994, at 48.
8 Id.
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implemented effectively, the potential exists for private Chinese enterprises
to operate as independent economic units.
9
Although the law theoretically permits ownership and operation of a
market oriented enterprise,' 0 numerous problems await such an enterprise in
China's current economy. Part II of this Article explores the economic
system from which China is emerging and some of the key economic levers
which make up the economy, including the role of law in the ongoing
transformation. The Chinese government needs to decide how best to
utilize law to achieve the economic changes it desires. It could use laws as
the West uses laws, to provide the basic structure and rules (leaving
economic units to achieve marketization independently), or it could use
laws as it did in the past with party directives, micro-managing the
enterprises to achieve marketization. The economic laws which have been
promulgated in China, including the Company Law, reflect that the
government has not been able to decide on the best course.
Part III describes two types of tension which exist in China that may
prevent the companies formed under this law from functioning efficiently as
market driven economic units. This article suggests that for a Chinese
company to operate efficiently under the existing system, some fundamental
challenges need to be met. The first challenge is termed "internal" because
it refers to management decisions within the companies. The inherent
tension is between increasing efficiency (which requires a greater diffusion
of decision-making power from the government to the directors of
companies) and maintaining centralized political power. To the extent that
central planning perpetuated the Communist Party's powers in China by
allowing it to allocate resources to sections which benefited the party (e.g.,
9 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 4.
10 Simultaneous with the passage of the Company Law, a set of regulations governing the
registration of the companies became effective. Administrative Rules of the People's Republic of China
Governing the Registration of Companies, reprinted in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 13-568
(1994). See discussion infra note 135. After the passage of the law, China also issued regulation
governing the listing of Limited Liability Companies abroad. Regulations on Overseas Listing of Stocks,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 26, 1994. However, as these regulations primarily relate to
the activities of Chinese enterprises outside of China, this paper will not engage in any detailed discussion
of them. For discussion of these regulations, see generally Fears Over H-Share Rules, S. CHtNA MORNING
POST, Oct. 23, 1994, at 4; Renee Lai, Exchange Takes Care Over China Dual Listing, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 18, 1994, at 3; Foo Choy Peng & Renee Lai, First Laws on Shares Abroad, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 19, 1994, at 1.
I I At least one author has suggested that in China, the state should pursue the role of law maker and
not that of the owner to achieve marketization. Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and its Discontent:
Understanding Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (1992).
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the military), the decentralization and marketization of economic power
likewise diffuses economic power and transfers it to the private sector. The
second type of challenge, termed "external," involves the relationship
between decentralized segments of Chinese society and refers to the
interaction between the companies chartered under the Company Law and
the rest of the Chinese society. This Article explores whether an entity can
operate to achieve maximum market efficiency in a society where many of
the other actors, such as suppliers and workers, play by different rules and
have different goals. The Company Law, to the extent it provides a more
efficient operating structure, limits its impact to only the enterprises which
are allowed to incorporate. China's central authorities have operated under
the belief that by legally recognizing privately owned companies, the
country can acquire and operate such entities within its existing system,
achieving market efficiency without losing the Communist Party's
ideological purity. This author suggests that significant political, economic,
and cultural conflicts which exist between these privately held enterprises
and the rest of Chinese society must be reconciled.
Part IV of this Article focuses on the provisions of the Law which
reflect the desire of the Chinese government to micro-manage enterprises,
the effect of which is to reduce the investment of private capital in these
companies and further delay privatization. The author recommends how the
Law may, nevertheless, be implemented without the detractions.
Part V demonstrates that a single piece of legislation cannot achieve
the goals of a market efficient economy without changing other aspects of
the economy. In China, the government is so intertwined with the
enterprises that changes in the economic structure necessarily entail changes
in the political structure. Without critical concurrent reforms in other
sectors of Chinese society, the establishment and operation of a private
"company" under China's new law will be a daunting, if not impossible,
task. Therefore, changes in the economic, social, and political arena are
necessary before China's economy can achieve market efficiency. In this
part the author also suggests some broad changes are needed on a macro
level in Chinese society for companies to reap the benefits of privatization.
12 Some scholars have suggested that any social reform to accommodate a change to a market
system requires a more fundamental change in what may be termed "Chinese values." PETER M.
LICHTENSTEIN, CHsNA AT THE BRINK 80 (1991). This author disagrees that such changes are inevitably
necessary. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are examples of societies which have maintained
traditional Chinese social values, such as a strong emphasis upon family relationships, while thriving under
a market economy.
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Since these suggestions impact economic, political, and social aspects of the
Chinese society, details of their implementation are outside of the scope of
this article.
Finally, Part VI concludes that without incentives for management to
make decisions based solely on market information, new enterprises formed
under the Company Law will not create efficiency in the Chinese economy
so long as the economy and its bureaucracy continue to operate in a
primarily socialist mode.
II. CHINA'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM
To gain a better understanding of how a company will operate in
China's transitional economy and to better appreciate the obstacles facing
the Chinese company, an overview of some of the key economic levers
which affect the Chinese economy is essential.
A. A Brief History
When it came to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party
adopted an economic system and management style patterned after the
13 1Soviet model. Property was owned either by the State or by collectives.' 4
Until 1978, China's economic system did not allow any of the normal
market mechanisms found in other countries to function. The economic
system was almost fully centralized and decisions that were made through
administrative organs were duly executed by the enterprises.' 5 Every aspect
of the economy was planned. 16 The government engaged in both macro and
micro planning.' 7 The macro planning included a master list of priority
13 CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 3, at 2.
14 Private ownership officially existed for a short period until the early 1950s. It consisted primarily
of providers of skilled trades, which had not been subsumed by the collective work groups. During the
"Great Leap Forward," such private ownership was virtually eliminated. Today, a very small segment of
the economy, primarily the service industry, is privately owned. For a discussion of these changes see Du
Mengkun, Government Budgets, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 3, at 39-40.
15 See generally Chen Jiyan, The Planning System, in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM (Gene Tidrick
& Chen Jiyuan eds., 1987).
16 Although the attempt was made, China never claimed that its planning was perfect. Many gaps
existed, and the planning often led to terrible economic consequences such as the widespread famines after
the so-called "Great Leap Forward." LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 80; A. JAMES GREGOR, supra note
3, at 80 (1995).
17 CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 148.
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industries which would receive material and funds first. 18 Then, the various
levels of government administrators micro-managed the enterprises on
every aspect of their operation, including purchasing, production, quality
control, and labor practices. 19 Those industries on the priority list were
supplied with raw materials at state-plan prices which were unrelated to
market conditions. 20  The system of controlling everything from the
purchasing of raw materials to the sale of goods was implemented in both
the state-owned enterprises and in the collectively-owned enterprises.
21
This centralized management approach governed nearly every aspect of all
enterprises from 1958 to 1978, covering nearly eighty-five percent of the
total economy of China.
22
China engaged in what is known as "directive planning" (Ziling
Jihua), where production units were given specific production targets to
meet.23 Under directive planning, management of China's enterprises were
nominally controlled by the state, and the actual power resided in the hands
of the various administrative organs and the bureaucrats who staffed these
organs.24 Numerous problems resulted from this arrangement. Enterprises
lacked the most basic decision making powers. Managers lacked the
18 See generally CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at Chapters 7 and 8.
19 CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 197.
20 Indergit Singh, China: Industrial Policies for an Economy in Transition, WORLD BANK
DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 143, 1992, at 15.
21 Such planning had the advantage of predictability, to the extent that the targeted goals were met.
However, its disadvantages were significant. Enterprises which produced goods lacked decision-making
power, management lacked incentive to be innovative and workers failed to share in the profitability (or
failure) of the enterprise. See Gene Tidrick, Planning and Supply, in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra
note 15, at 196-97. For a discussion of centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe and their
similarities to China, see Richard Portes, From Central Planning to a Market Economy, in MAKING
MARKETS: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE POST SOVIET STATES 20-36
(Shafiqul Islam & Michael Mandelbaum eds., 1993).
22 DU, supra note 14, at 40. In 1978, the state sector's share of industrial output was 77%. By 1994,
this figure had fallen to 40%. Mark O'Neill, Senior Official Defends China's State Ownership, REUTER
ASIA-PACIFIC BUS. REP., Feb. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BUSDTL file. Among the
state enterprises, close to half are losing money, with the government heavily subsidizing these losses.
Xiao Yu, Backing for State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1994, at 8.
23 ROBERT C. HSU, ECONOMIC THEORIES IN CHINA, 1979-1988 35 (1991). See generally ZHOU,
supra note 3.
24 Every Chinese enterprise is run by two heads, the manager or factory director and the party
secretary. For most of the past four decades since the Communists took power, any ultimate decision
rested with the party secretary. Theoretically, the manager was in charge of production and the party
leader was to ensure conformity to party policy. However, if the two objectives clashed, which they often
did, the party policy always prevailed. As with any creature with two heads, reaching any particular
objective efficiently became difficult if not impossible. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 37.
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authority to make production and sales decisions, such as determining what
to produce, what to purchase, whom to hire, when to borrow money and
repay loans, and how to distribute products. All of these decisions were
determined by the State's plan as interpreted by several layers of
bureaucracy.
25
The centralized system took away any incentive for Chinese
enterprise to be innovative and profitable. To the enterprises, profits were
irrelevant since excess earnings were not retained but simply turned over to
26the government. Losses did not decrease jobs, output, or salaries since the
27government subsidized these losses. The net effect of this system was to
encourage, across the economy as a whole, complacency and resignation to
the point of stagnation.
B. Role ofLaw
China's legal system prior to 1978 was devoid of economic
legislation.28 It did not have any of the most fundamental legislation such
as contract law, tax codes, and corporation codes. Such laws were
unnecessary since all economic agreements entered into were between
government units. If one party were to breach a contract, any damages
ordered would be paid from one government fund to another, a rather
meaningless exercise which the Chinese avoided. If a party breached an
agreement and the government felt that the breach affected central planning,
private enforcement under a judicial proceeding was unnecessary because
25 ZHOU, supra note 3, at 2-5. See also Zheng Guangliang, The Leadership System, in CHINA'S
INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 304. In China, the decision to expand operations due to growing
demand was not made within the operating enterprise, but was instead made by an administrative
bureaucrat. Usually, this bureaucrat has little or no understanding of the enterprise's product or concern
about its market position. The administrator may also have a political agenda which is inconsistent with
the welfare of the enterprise. An example of inconsistent goals may be when a factory's resources,
machinery, labor, and raw materials are ordered to produce military uniforms which are then "sold" to the
government at set low prices to meet a political need when those same resources would be economically
more profitable producing consumer clothing in greater demand and selling for higher prices. See supra
LICHTENSTEIN, note 12, at 36.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 As of the 1980's, of the 420 laws, regulations and legal directives which have been promulgated
by China since 1979, over 330 regulate economic activities. Gu Ming, Recent Development in Chinese
Economic Legislation, 21 U.S. L. Rev. 217 (1987). In the last three years, of the 72 laws adopted by the
National People's Congress, 24 were economic laws. China's Economic Legislation at Crucial Stage, XN
HUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, CURNWS file.
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the government simply ordered specific performance. 29  This method
sufficed in a planned economy where production units were under direct
government control.
With the decision to marketize in 1978, the rules changed. After
experiencing governmental control for over thirty years, Chinese enterprises
were suddenly called upon to produce market efficiency. The first effort to
implement elements of a market system was directed at attracting foreign
investment. But given China's lack of laws, foreigners were unwilling to
invest in China, and expressed a reluctance to invest without legal
protection and procedures to address breaches. The Chinese government
recognizes that its ability to attract such investors depended on the foreign
confidence in China's legal processes. Legal regulations served to engender
greater foreign confidence. Therefore, a crucial part of marketization was
the adoption of a system of economic regulation. While China recognized
the need for economic legislation to replace the command economy with
market values, it was also conscious of the loss of power which
accompanied the transition. To address this issue, China took its first step
toward marketization in a controlled environment by carefully monitoring
the type and quantities of foreign investment projects. Each project
required approval by the government.
30
China's efforts to change its political and economic systems by
legislation which would encourage more reliance on market factors began
long before the promulgation of the Company Law. As early as 1979, soon
after China's decision to "open its doors" to the rest of the world, China
enacted a set of joint venture laws, which enabled foreign investors to invest
in China by joint venturing with Chinese entities. 31 The joint venture laws
were the first introduction of private ownership in China. Although the
Chinese partner of a joint venture was almost always a government entity, at
least the portion of the joint venture's assets owned by the foreign party was
in private hands.
Pressure from foreign companies desiring more flexible forms of
investment in China led to enactment of further legislation allowing for
other forms of business, such as cooperative joint ventures and, very
29 This preference for specific performance is reflected in the Civil Law, art. I I.
30 Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in China L. Foreign
Bus. (CCH Austl.) 5-550, art. 27 (1985).
31 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures, reprinted in
China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 6-500, art. 1 (1979).
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importantly, wholly-owned foreign enterprises. The creation of these
wholly-owned foreign enterprises meant that at least small parts of China's
economy became privately owned and managed by foreigners. The
percentage of such foreign enterprises was so small that it had negligible
impact on China's economy, but it was, nevertheless, an important policy
change. China also established various special economic zones along the
coastal regions to encourage foreign investment and trade.33 These zones
provided flexible forms of investment to foreign investors and lower tax
rates. Most of these zones have been very successful economically.
Investment by Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Chinese is especially
concentrated in these zones
Reflected in these past economic laws, and in the Company Law, is
the delicate balance of allowing some independent decision making on the
enterprise level to achieve maximum operating efficiency while giving up
the minimum amount of political control. The laws are typically designed
to facilitate activities the government wishes to encourage without
relinquishing the rights that would limit state power. Chinese laws tend to
contain, paradoxically, provisions which are vague and broadly drafted,
accompanied by detailed restrictions. The former gives maximum room for
interpretation by bureaucrats, which can vary as government policies
change. The latter allows the government to prohibit activities which it
deems to be harmful.34
Some of this economic legislation has achieved significant success by
attracting foreign investment, 5 although foreign investors still often
32 Law of People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises With Sole Foreign Investment,
reprinted in China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl.) 13-506 (1986).
33 For background information pertaining to the formation and development of the Special
Economic Zones, see generally CHINA'S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (David S.G. Goodman ed., 2d Ed.
1990); GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (1990);
CAROL LEE HAMRIM, CHINA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE (1990); HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S
SECOND REVOLUTION (1987); ROBERT KLEINBERG, CHINA'S "OPENING" TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD(1990);
COLIN MACKERRAS ET AL., CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION & 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS' (1994).
34 For example, specific laws encouraging foreign investment would detail the sectors of economy
which foreign investment is encouraged but be vague as to the benefits foreign investors would receive
when investing in those sectors. Law on Encouragement of Foreign Investment, arts. 2 & 15. Often, laws
are broad policy statements which promise unspecified "'relevant regulations" to clarify the ambiguities.
Until such regulations are issued, interpretation of any ambiguity is left to the bureaucrats who are in
charge of enforcement. See supra note 32.
35 In the past 15 years China has received $60 billion in foreign investment. Qiu Qi, China: Trade
Minister Optimistic Rejoining GA7T, BUS. WK, Feb. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library,
BUSWK file.
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complain of the difficulties in dealing with Chinese partners who are not
motivated by profits and bureaucrats who are obstructionists. 36  The
question is whether the same success can be achieved when the scope of the
marketization is expanded to individual domestic enterprises.
C. Creating a Socialist Market System
While China has taken steps to transform its economy from one that
is planned to one that is driven by market forces, that process is far from
complete. Vestiges of the planned economy and its instruments remain and
continue to control significant portions of the Chinese economy today.
Much has been written in the western press about this "fundamental
change" in China's policies and many commentators have advanced the
idea that this change signals the end of Communism and represents concrete
proof of the superiority and basic correctness of western capitalism.
37
However, China's decision to change its system is markedly different from
the changes occurring in the former Soviet Union and various eastern
European countries. For example, China's decision was self-made, not
forced upon her by the collapse of the previous system. China was able, at a
relatively early date, to perceive the need for this transformation and to take
measured steps to implement changes.38 Other differences in population,
size, culture, stage of economic development, natural resources, and
political structure render comparisons between China's transformation and
those occurring in Eastern Europe inappropriate.39
36 Julia S. Sensenbrenner, The Evolving Enterprise, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 35.
37 See, e.g., ZHOU, supra note 3, at 14-15, 174.
38 ISLAM & MANDELBAUM, supra note 21, at 15.
39 None of the Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union have a population anywhere near
China's. China's economic development has been considered to be further along than most, with the
possible exception of Hungary. Politically, China's leadership is attempting to marketize without
dismantling its own power base, in marked contrast to the toppling of the Communist Party in most of the
Eastern European countries. Peter Harold, China's Reform Experience to Date, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION
PAPERS No. 180, 1992, at 1-4. For those interested in the experience and analysis of Eastern European
countries and the former Soviet Union, see generally CAPITALIST GOALS, SOCIALIST PAST: THE RISE OF
THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN COMMAND ECONOMIES (Perry L. Patterson ed., 1993); ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT &
REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE & THE SOVIET UNION (Joseph C. Brada et al. eds., 1987); ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE: A PROGRESS REPORT (Richard Portes ed., 1994); THE ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF EASTERN EUROPE (Bernard S. Katz & Libby Rittenberg eds., 1992); PRIVATIZATION
& ECONOMIC REFORM IN CENTRAL EUROPE (Dennis A. Rondinelli ed., 1994); ROMAN FRYDMAN &
ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE (1993); ROMAN FRYDMAN &
ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: Is THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? (1994);
MARKET SOCIALISM OR THE RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM? (Anders Aslund ed., 1992); REFORMING THE
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Another major distinction between China's transformation and that
occurring in Eastern Europe and Russia is that China's change, at least
nominally, is only in the economic sphere. Politically, China continues to
adhere to Marxist/Maoist doctrines.4 °
China is one of a few countries in the world which still professes
adherence to communism. 41 Of these countries, China is the only one with
any significant economic power. Recognizing that continued adherence to
the rigid, centrally planned economic system of traditional Communism
would not induce the desired type of progress and growth, China has
embarked on a path to create a "socialist system with Chinese
characteristics" or "socialist market economy," which essentially consists of
42injecting certain market aspects into a planned economy. To China, it
matters little that "socialism" and "market system" are contradictory terms.
The Chinese leadership would like to keep the facade of socialism, as it is
the basis which the Chinese Communist came to power, while adopting as
much of capitalism in substance as it can in the economic sector. To avoid
the appearance of abandoning socialism, China initially called the new
system a "commodity production economy" and later changed the label to a
"socialist market economy. 43
Some scholars may be interested in debating whether China is
"maintaining a socialist economy with unique Chinese characteristics" as its
leaders declare, or whether it has become capitalist and is simply continuing
outdated political rhetoric for the convenience of those in power. Others
may well adopt Deng Xiao Ping's pragmatic (and much touted) slogan: "It
doesn't matter what color the cat so long as it catches mice." 44 This attitude
ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION &
DEVELOPMENT (1992); 1 THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE (Oliver Jean Blanchard et al. eds., 1994); 2
THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE, id.; TRIALS OF TRANSITION: ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE FORMER
COMMUNIST BLOC (Michael Keren & Gur Ofer eds., 1992).
40 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 1I.
41 Other communist countries include Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam.
42 Bill Brugger, Democracy and Organization in Chinese Industry - New Directions?, in CHINA:
DILEMMAS OF MODERNIZATION 62-63 (Graham Young ed., 1985).
43 The label "commodity production economy" or "commodity economy" was used early in the
reform process in 1983 and 1984 to avoid antagonizing the more conservative factions of the communist
party. See JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC
DEBATE 133 (1994). In 1992, after the Fourteenth Party Congress, when the reform movement was more
secure, the use of the term "socialist market economy" was adopted. Id. at 146. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 41. Apparently, the purpose of introducing market mechanisms into a socialist system is to
make the planning more efficient and flexible, not change the system to a capitalist economy.
44 ZHOU, supra note 3, at xi.
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allows the Chinese government to maintain a pretense that it has not
abandoned the principles upon which the Communist Party was founded
while implementing reform measures which look more and more like
capitalism.
D. The Key Economic Levers
The following is a more detailed discussion of the major economic
levers which propel the Chinese economy. Particular emphasis is placed
upon the factors which closely relate to the operation of a company in
China's transitional economy. The specific factors also relate clearly to
certain fundamental preconditions of a market economy: the ability to
decide what to produce, how much to produce, the number and specifics of
employees, prices of goods and services provided and allocation of profits.
1. Production
In planned economies, factories produce goods to meet government
specifications and not market demands. Since purchase decisions are also
made by the State, no real incentive exists for the enterprises to produce
innovative goods with better quality. In contrast, enterprises in market
economies manufacture to meet market demands. As China's economic
growth is highly dependent upon export, Chinese enterprises are now
beginning to plan their production and design their products according to
the demands of the international market. Without price de-control, access to
investment and raw material, and the ability to hire and fire workers as
needed, the ability of individual factories to respond to market signals
remains limited.45
Furthermore, making efficient production decisions depends on
access to market information which in turn allows decisions to be made
according to the infohmation received. While it clearly is true that market
economies do not always have perfect access to information, in China, the
type of information available to a production unit is particularly skewed and
inadequate. The government is the primary, if not the sole source, of such
information and often, the statistics reflect political agenda and not actual
45 ZHOU, supra note 3, at 58-59.
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facts.46 The problem is further complicated when portions of the economy
remain under central planning and portions attempt to operate under market
rules. Information and statistics cannot reflect true market conditions, only
partial or mixed messages.
47
There is also the question whether market information, to the extent it
is available, will lead to appropriate production responses by the enterprise.
A possible example of a perverse response in a transitional economy is that
a factory would raise prices to counterbalance the decreased demand for its
products. This decision could well be the result of a need for full
employment4s or the vestiges of an older system which dictated production
units. Chinese enterprises are so accustomed to their monopolistic practices
that their response to competition may not be the same of an enterprise
familiar with operating under market rules.4 9
2. Prices
In China, the government is the arbiter of prices of goods rather than
the supply and demand of market forces.50 Often, these prices are arbitrary
51and bear no relationship to the cost of manufacturing or market prices.
The danger of massive price reform-relinquishing governmental
control and allowing price to be determined by market demand and
46 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
47 Under a planned economy, information is gathered by the government and the decisions are made
accordingly. Although this information was not perfect, at least it was as close to complete as the
government could make it. With part of the enterprises in state hands and part private, the collection and
dissemination of information will be much more difficult. One of the greatest challenges facing a
transition economy is the task of facilitating information flow and exchange to allow for informed
decisions. China is no exception. Raimund Dietz, Ten Propositions Towards a Theory of Transformation,
in FROM COMMAND TO EXCHANGE COMMUNICATION, IN THE TRANSITION FROM COMMAND TO MARKET
ECONOMIES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 77 (Sandor Richter ed., 1992).
48 See infra note 55.
49 For example, one author has noted how readily Chinese distributors accept pricing policies and
leads set by others in the distribution chain. This acquiescence is attributed to vestiges of old state pricing
policies. Jane Greaver, The Right Price. CHINESE BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 31.
50 FRANCIS A LEES. AND K. THOMAS LIAW, FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN CHINA'S BANKING AND
SECURITIES MARKET, 146-148 (1996).
51 As a result of arbitrary pricing, China often found itself subsidizing exports when the price of
manufacturing exceeded the international market prices. Id. Subsidies of exports have been gradually
eliminated in the early 1990s. Speech by Heng qi Ding, Commercial Counsel, People's Republic of China
Consulate General, San Francisco on June 24, 1996 during World Affairs Council Conference, US.-China
Trade: MFN, WTO - 1997. Oakland, California.
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supply-is the possibility of runaway inflation once price control is lifted.
52
Due to long term price control and shortage of goods, the sudden lifting of
controls may cause certain prices, especially of goods in short supply, to
increase unchecked. These increases may far outpace the real income
earnings of the people.53 To prevent this problem, the Chinese government
has kept the prices of basic commodities such as rice and oil stable while
allowing more fluctuations with non-essential goods such as television and
fans.
54
3. Labor Policies
A central factor in planning production and setting prices is the cost
of labor. In China, where there is an abundance of labor, efficient allocation
and pricing of labor have previously been unimportant. Instead, the goal of
labor allocation was to achieve full employment. This goal is hardly
surprising, for the Chinese communists came into power during an era of
great labor unrest. In that era, the need to keep workers occupied, however
inefficiently, far exceeded the need for efficient allocation.55
52 Josef C. Brada et al., Economic Stabilization, Structural Adjustment, and Economic Reform; in
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 6-7 (Josef C. Brada et
al. eds., 1988). See HsU, supra note 23, at 143.
53 China has already seen inflation in the prices of consumer products. For years, China's national
resources were invested almost exclusively to increase her industrial and military output. This emphasis
was at the expense of producing consumer goods. If enterprises are allowed to decide what to produce, the
natural inclination would be to produce consumer goods which are in greater demand. See GREAVER,
supra note 49, at 47.
54 An excellent discussion of price reform and suggestions for gradual implementation is included in
the World Bank Study. THE WORLD BANK, CHINA: BETWEEN PLAN AND MARKET 59-67 (1990).
55 Chinese workers do not choose the fields which they wish to enter. Rather, upon graduation from
high school or other educational institutions, workers are assigned to various enterprises. William Byrd &
Gene Tidrick, Factor Allocation and Enterprise Incentives, in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note
15, at 67-69. Therefore, it is often possible to find a worker in a toy factory whose interest lies in garment
design, or a worker in a botanical garden whose major in college was English. With this type of labor
allocation, China's labor system is, at best, inefficient.
In the 1960's and early 1970's, the problem of too many urban laborers was solved by simply
sending high school and college graduates to the countryside to learn from the peasant class. BRUGGER,
supra note 42, at 87; see also Zhao Lukuan & Lu Guotai, Employment and Wages in Cities and Towns, in
CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 3, at 188. Workers could be recalled if they were needed. If they
were not needed, they would simply be left on semi-permanent agricultural duty. BRUGGER, supra note 42,
at 86-88. While this system of allocation did not take into account the talents or desires of the worker, it is
accepted by most as a better alternative to unemployment. For an interesting discussion of the history of
the assignment system, see Zou Ji, The Assignment of Jobs to College Graduates, in CASE STUDIES OF
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 51-79 (Timothy King & Zhang Jiping eds., 1992).
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As a direct result of the need to solidify control and gain worker
support, the government guaranteed the state sector life long employment.5 6
The term "iron rice bowl" is used to describe the notion that one could not
be fired regardless of one's performance on the job.57  While this practice
has been somewhat curtailed in China, the concept of lifelong, or at least
long-term, guaranteed employment prevails. Because vestiges of the "iron
rice bowl" remain, enterises find it is still difficult to fire an inefficient
worker in China today. The government is equally a-fraid to change the
status quo.
In China's labor market, a new form of state sanctioned nepotism has
59emerged. It is not uncommon for a person who is retiring to be replaced
by his or her child, regardless of the child's background or training. In fact,
this practice of handing a job to one's offspring has been used by many
industries to induce early retirement of older workers. 60  The replacement
worker, however, may neither be experienced nor have any interest in thejob. While inefficient, the system of replacement by a child insures that
retiring workers receive their share of a pension for a set amount of time,
61and the children are guaranteed a job.
56 Since all enterprises were owned by the state, almost every job was guaranteed life long
employment. As of 1995, it is estimated that state-owned enterprises still employ about 70% of China's
urban workers. Problems Remain for China in Economic Reform Process, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA),
(Feb. 21, 1995), available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, BNAIBF file.
57 The rice bowl represented the job. To break your rice bowl is to lose your job. If the bowl was
made of iron, it was unbreakable.
58 This issue of replacing inefficient workers first became a problem when Sino-foreign joint
ventures had great difficulty firing inefficient workers. This problem persists today. LEES AND LIAW, supra
note 50. With increases in foreign investors complaining the Chinese government reluctantly allowed the
firing of workers from the joint venture. However, the state owned enterprises were slow to adopt this
practice and redundant workers still exist at these enterprises. Byrd and Tidrick, in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 68, 74; Gu ZHIBIN, CHINA BEYOND DENG: REFORM IN THE PRC 57-58 (1991).
59 CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 70.
60 For example, at one major steel producer, with 200,000 employees, 17,000 children replaced
retiring parents between 1980-83. CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 70-71.
61 Despite its label as a socialist country, China has yet to develop a formal social security system.
Chinese workers rely heavily on the pension they receive from their employer upon retirement.
Experimentation with unemployment insurance and other social insurance programs has begun in some of
the special economic zone where enterprises are seeking to attract skilled workers from outside the SEZs.
To do so, these enterprises, having been allowed more self direction than others in China, have
experimented with innovative programs including medical insurance, old age pensions, and workman's
compensation. See generally, China-Social Insurance in the South, 1992 NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK
MARKET REPORTS, Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, WORLD library, BUSANL file. Because these
pensions are paid by the specific unit or enterprise and not by a national or provincial common fund, the
lack of social security further reduces job mobility for workers. Furthermore, for those who have never
been employed, the expectation is that families will take care of members who cannot work.
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Traditionally, wages in Communist China were set by- the
government and responded to neither productivity nor efficiency. The
Marxist ideal of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his
need" undermined any incentive to work,62 because the State theoretically
provided for each citizen's needs regardless of an individual's employment
status.63  In the last few years, officials have been touting a new slogan:
"compensation according to work done." 64  Various enterprises have
introduced bonus systems, which theoretically award bonuses according to
the workers' performance. 65  In reality, many of the bonuses are still
awarded on a massive company-wide basis, without singling out individual
workers based on merit. Years of indoctrination with egalitarian theory
make it hard for workers and managers to adopt to radically different ideas
such as paychecks which are not all identical and to accept merit based
compensation.
Labor issues played an important role in the events which led to the
1949 revolution in China. 66 Chinese officials are certainly sensitive to this
issue and will go to great lengths to avoid actions which would result in
widespread unemployment. 67  China also refuses to officially recognize
unemployment as problem and has made no provision for unemployment
compensation. This refusal to confront the existence of unemployment has
also created an anomaly in China's labor statistics: an entire class of youth
who are "waiting for assignment" do not appear in China's official
62 ALVIN W. GOULDNER, AGAINST FRAGMENTATION: THE ORIGINS OF MARXISM AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF INTELLECTUALS 47 (1985).
63 Directly, the state employs 108 million people, almost three-fourths of the urban labor force. This
figure does not include industries heavily subsidized or dependent on the government to maintain its
operations. Sheryl WuDunn, For Sale: Creaky Gears of Chinese Communism, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1993, §
4, at 7, available in LEXIS, WORLD library, ARCNWS file.
64 Du Peirong, Motivating Workers in a Large State-Owned Enterprise, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC
REFORM, supra note 3, at 89; Shekou Industrial Zone Marks 15th Anniversary, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Oct. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, XINHUA file.
65 CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 73.
66 Widespread unemployment and food shortages were the two main causes of poverty and hunger
in China prior to the revolution. On the promise of food and employment for all and equitable distribution
of wealth, the Communist Party came to power in 1949. See S. BERNARD THOMAS, LABOR AND THE
CHINESE REVOLUTION 236-47 (1983).
67 Problems Remain for China in Economic Reform Process, supra note 56. The continuous subsidy
of inefficient and poorly managed enterprises has been attributed to the government's fears of the resulting
unemployment if such enterprises were allowed to go bankrupt. The Company Law also reflects the
government's sensitivity to labor concerns by inclusion of representatives of employees on the Board of
Directors. COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 45.
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unemployment numbers. The State would like to see some of these young
people enter the newly emerging private sector, but many of these
prospective workers are afraid to risk their chance to grasp the "iron rice
bowl" by forsaking public-sector employment.
69
4. Sources of Capital: Loans and Investors
In the past, the government was the sole source of funding70 and
allocation of capital by the government did not necessarily correspond to
the efficiency of the enterprise, and inefficient enterprises which operated
continually at a loss could still obtain capital from the government. Unlike
capitalist societies where only enterprises with good or excellent
performance would be able to obtain additional capital, the Chinese
government continually subsidized enterprises without regard to efficiency
or profitability, often only to further governmental policy objectives.'
Much of the government subsidies were designed to keep enterprises in
operation in order to avoid unemployment of the workers, a political rather
than economic decision.72  As a result, well-connected but inefficient
enterprises often were able to obtain large capital infusions to continue
operating.
Even as China moves towards a system where capital is acquired
from sources other than direct government grants, 73 such as bank loans,
problems still exist with the system. Often banks are pressured by officials
68 China Says Unemployment Rising as Economy Changes, REUTER ASIA/PACIFIC" BUSINESS
REPORT, Dec. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, REUAPB file.
69 Retirement Insurance Gives People More Job Choices, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 6, 1994,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPIC library, XINHUA file. However, as social insurance programs are
implemented, these anxieties should be alleviated. Yojana Sharma, China-Labor: State Social Security to
Replace Iron Rice Bowls, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Market library,
FACNWS file.
70 Expansions were funded by government allocations in the form of budgetary grants. Singh, supra
note 20, at 3. If such grants were unavailable because there was a shortage of funds nationally, then the
project would be stalled, sometimes indefinitely. Tremendous inefficiencies resulted. When the
government coffers were flush, numerous grants were made to start a number of projects simultaneously.
Singh, supra note 20, at 3. When a shortage of funds developed at the government level, all of the
projects, without regard to their merits, would be halted. Singh, supra note 20, at 3.
71 Problems Remain for China in Economic Reform Process, supra note 56.
72 Mark O'Neill, China to Step up Battle Against Inflation, Corruption, REUTER WORLD SER., March
6, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, REUWLD file; Jeffrey Parker, China 9S Reform Targets
Wheezing State Industry, REUTER BUS. REP., Oct. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library,
REUBUS file.
73 See Singh, supra note 20.
VOL. 5 No. 3
CHINA 'S COMPANY LAW
seeking loans for specific pet projects of the local officials. Banks
operating locally must respond to pressure from local officials who have a
special interest in seeing a particular project funded. The notion that
"official notes could become bank notes" (Tiaozi Bian Piaozi) has become
an accepted phrase. 74  With this type of inefficient allocation of capital
where banks lend based on the amount of pressure received rather than the
feasibility of the project, well-connected but inefficient enterprises will
often receive funding instead of the efficient ones.
Some portions of China's economy, especially those funded by
foreign investment, operated under some pressure to be efficient. For
example, joint ventures often borrowed funds from foreign banks based on
economic projections in the joint ventures' feasibility reports. 75 These loans
were usually guaranteed by the investors or the Bank of China.7 6 The
success and failure of these joint ventures taught lessons of fiscal
responsibility to Chinese enterprises unaccustomed to such notions.
Another traditional source of capital in market economies is
accumulated profits. However, in Chinese enterprises, the notion of
accumulating profits for future expansion is not always attractive to the
managers and owners of the enterprise. Although theoretically an enterprise
may now keep some of its profits, the managers and owners often fear the
ever present possibility that the government will take its "share," either by
direct collection or by changing the tax laws. Also, because managers do
not necessarily benefit from capital expansion, the incentive is to spend
profits on the type of expenditure which would immediately benefit the
workers (e.g., a cafeteria, more cars for management, bonuses to
management and workers, etc.) and not on expanding production.
Even if an enterprise wanted to expand and could set aside funds for
that purpose, the inability to acquire property or competitors without
government approval hinders efficient expansion. In China, since each
enterprise is under the supervision of a ministry, the target company or
adjacent facility which one enterprise may wish to acquire are often under
the administration of different ministries, each of whose approval would be
74 See HSu, supra note 23, at 100.
75 All joint ventures in China are required to prepare a feasibility report as part of the approval
process. Procedures for the Registration, Examination and Approval of Joint Ventures Using Chinese &
Foreign Investment, CHINA LAW No. 92, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, CHINAL file.
76 However, recently, China has declared a new policy of restricting government guarantees of any
further loans. Quak Hiang Whai, China Loan Guarantee Ruling Holds Up Some Agreement, BUS. TIMES,
May 17, 1995, at 23.
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required for merger or acquisition. 77 Therefore, the normal economies of
scale that might be achieved by combining certain enterprises do not occur
naturally in China. Unfortunately, the Company Law does nothing to
eliminate this bureaucratic roadblock as it explicitly states that the
administrative organs in charge of the enterprises owned by the State would
remain in charge of the company after incorporation. 78 The Law also
specifies that mergers of companies limited by shares are subject to
approval of the state authorized departments after the shareholders have
adopted a merger resolution.
79
III. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
Despite all of the recent changes to the economy, until the
promulgation of the Company Law, China remained primarily a socialist
country wherein almost all property was owned by the State. Now, after
adopting the Company Law, China officially recognizes and encourages
private ownership by Chinese citizens. Notably, however, the Law makes
no provision to privatize the existing state owned enterprises, it merely
allows for incorporation in appropriate cases. How well these "privately
run and operated" and newly incorporated, state owned corporations will
face the challenges of functioning in China's present society is the question
at hand.
In addition to how the Company Law will interact externally with the
rest of China's evolving economy, several intrinsic problems in the
Company Law deserve critical attention. With the marketization of
enterprises in China, the question of control remains. If the government can
no longer directly order the decisions of many enterprises, who will monitor
the activities of the companies? If a company is not totally owned by
private citizens, with their self interest as the motivating factor, who will
monitor the activities of the managers and workers? In a capitalist model,
theoretically, the market system monitors the companies-the stock market
reflects the inefficiencies of the enterprise by depressing the price and
investors sell their stock. In severe situations, creditors force the enterprises
77 See Singh, supra note 20, at 20.
78 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 66.
79 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, arts. 182-83.
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into bankruptcy or the competition takes over the operation. These external
monitoring devices are currently unavailable or inadequate in China.
80
The next section analyzes the Company Law in detail, including
analysis of how some of the provisions of the Law may be ill suited to the
goal of marketization. In many instances the Law provides only a cosmetic
change to the organization of the Chinese enterprises. The old Chinese
adage of "changing the soup but not the medicine" (huan ton bu huan yau)
is apt in this instance.
A. Internal Challenges
1. Corporate Control: Relationship Between China's "Board of
Stockholders" and the "Board of Directors"
The Chinese equivalent for a publicly traded United States
corporation is a company limited by shares.81  The equivalent of a U.S.
closely held corporation in China is a "limited liability company" ("LLC").
Wherever the term "company" is used in this article, the reader should
interpret it as a limited liability company.82  Unless specifically noted, the
discussion which follows is applicable to both types of companies.
80 Currently, the Chinese stock market has relatively few shares listed, and with the restrictive
provisions of the Company Law, few new ones are likely to be listed in the near future. China currently
lacks any meaningful securities regulation to ensure that the market actually reflects the value of the stock
and to prevent manipulation of the market by individuals or government entities. Although China issued
Provisional Regulations on the administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks on April 23, 1993
("Provisional Regulations") and Interim Procedures for Prohibiting Securities Fraud ("Interim
Procedures"), aimed at trading on inside information and fraud such as use of material information to affect
the market, these measures do not provide clear definitions or remedies to stockholders who are harmed by
these activities. Provisional Regulations, BBC Summary of World Broadcast, May 20, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News library, BBSCW File; Interim Procedures, BBC Summary of World Broadcast, Sept. 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, News library, BBSCW File. China's much debated securities law may actually
be passed in the next two years. China's Economic Legislation at Crucial Stage, Xinhua News, Feb. 29,
1996, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, XINHUA File.
81 Some translate the term "Gu Fen Yo Xian Gun Shi" to "Joint Stock Company." COMPANY LAW,
supra note 5, art. 2.
82 Although the limited liability company also exists as a form of business in forty-eight states of the
United States, the differences described below will seek to contrast the Chinese limited liability company
from the "C" corporation and the newer "LLC" in the United States. Arnold D. Litt, Susan M. Marra &
Robert A. Mathers, Tax Hot Spots in Conversions to Limited Liability Companies, N.J.L.J., Aug. 21, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News library, NJLAWJ File; Maria Shao, Legislators Pass "Limited Liability" Bills,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, BGLOBE File.
JULY 1996
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Although the structure of a Chinese LLC looks like its counterparts in
the United States, Japan, and Germany, some dramatic differences exist.
83
For example, the Company Law specifies that the shareholder group is
intended to be the company's most powerful authority.84  While
theoretically the shareholders in any private enterprise are the owners, and
therefore in control of the enterprise, in larger corporations in the United
States such control has long passed from the owners to the managers.
Unlike the United States, where shareholders merely meet to vote on
resolutions already passed by the board of directors, the shareholders in a
Chinese company are authorized to pass their own resolutions and to
approve the company's budget as well as profit distributions.
85
Because the Company Law vests the power to determine a company's
business policies and investment plans in the hands of the "shareholders,"
as opposed to a board of directors, the power to control a large part of the
State's assets remains effectively in the hands of the State's administrative
organs. In fact, for a company which is wholly state owned, the Law does
not even pretend that the power has shifted to the "shareholders."
Companies wholly owned by the State need not establish a board of
shareholders, but may instead empower a board of directors, appointed by
the state, to exercise all powers of the company.86
Theoretically, of course, all state-owned property is owned by the
"whole people." However, since the whole people, as shareholders, could
not possibly exercise their rights in directing the company's business
policies and investment plans, business decisions are made by the same
bureaucrats who controlled the enterprise before the enactment of the
Company Law. Given the shareholders' power to "decide the company's
expansion and reduction plan as well as to issue corporate bonds and to
make decisions on mergers and liquidation," 87 as representation of the
"shareholders" an administrative organ can completely control the direction
of a company partly owned by the state and even order the dissolution of a
company by voting as the representative of the shareholders. Even if such a
decision is contrary to the interest of the company and against the
83 Preston M. Torbert, China's New Company Law Codifies Investor Protection, THE CHINA BUS.
REV., May, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, ASAPII File.
84 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 37.
85 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 38
86 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 66, 68.
87 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 19, 20.
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recommendation of the board of directors, the Law does not prevent such
actions.
In the United States, all of the above described powers would
typically rest with the board of directors. 88  While the United States
shareholders may have a say in voting to accept or reject major decisions
affecting the disposition of the company, they normally lack the power to
initiate such a resolution.8 9  In stark contrast, according to the Company
Law, a limited liability company in China does not even require a board of
directors. 90 Article 45 of the Company Law states only that a limited
liability company may establish a board of directors.9 1 Thus, key decision
making powers have been taken from the board of directors, who might be
comprised of professional managers, and placed with the shareholders who
are represented by life-tenured civil servants. In the case of wholly state
owned enterprises, the'board of directors is appointed by the state, thereby
maintaining much the old line of control and the old style of management.
92
In the United States, allocation of decisional responsibility to the
board of directors stems from the notion that the directors are more familiar
with the company's operation than the average shareholder. 93  Thus, the
board's expertise places them in a better position to initiate actions and
make decisions. In China, by putting these powers into the hands of the less
knowledgeable shareholders instead of the board of directors, the Company
Law fails to utilize the potential board's expertise. By limiting the power of
the board or simply appointing the board from existing bureaucrats, a
conversion from a state owned enterprise to a state owned LLC does very
88 For more information regarding the role of U.S. corporate boards of directors see generally JAY
W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWS OR POTENTATES, THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS (1989); J. KEITH LOUDEN, TE DIRECTOR (1982); STANLEY C. VANCE, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP:
BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND STRATEGY (1983).
89 The directors have all corporate powers and the ability to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. Model Business Corp. Act § 35 (1978); Revised Model Business Corp. Act §§ 8.01, 8.11,
8.30 (1984).
90 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, arts. 43, 51, but see Robert A. Art and Minkang Gu, China
Incorporated The First Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. OF INT'L L. 273,
295 (Summer 1995) ( stating "Every corporation must have a board of directors .... ).
91 Another element that reflects the socialist/communist nature of the Chinese company is the
requirement in Article 45 of the Company Law that an employee representative be elected to the board.
Again, this is a requirement not found in the United States. COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 45.
92 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 68.
93 See generally, Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation
in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379 (Winter, 1994); ADOLF A.
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 132 (1967.)
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little to change the power and management structure of the enterprise. This
is perhaps the intended result since the party exerts greater authority over
bureaucrats than over professional managers.
This peculiarity of the Chinese company structure is further reflected
in the deliberately vague language in the law, which places limitations on
the board of directors' powers. The board is charged with the
implementation (Zhi Xing) of shareholders' resolutions,94 the determination
(Jue Ding) of the company's business and investment plans,95 and the
formulation (Zhi Ding) of the company's profit distribution and loss
recovery plan.96 The Law does not state that the board of directors has the
power to decide profit distribution and loss recovery; rather, the board is to
formulate such a plan for the shareholders to decide upon, and then to
implement the shareholders decision. Again, this approach contrasts
sharply with the organization of a corporation in the United States, where
such basic business decisions rest solely with the board of directors, and the
disgruntled stockholders' remedy is to elect a new board.97 Since the State
will be the majority shareholder of these converted enterprises, delegation
of key powers to the shareholder level effectively allows the State to retain
control. 98 When the State is the sole shareholder of a converted enterprise,
the State appoints the board members and thereby achieves even more direct
control 99
2. Supervisory Committee
Another organizational feature of the Chinese company is the
"supervisory committee" which consists of shareholders' representatives
94 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 112(2).
95 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 112(3).
96 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 112(5).
97 In the United States, the board of directors is elected by the shareholders pursuant to the
corporation's articles of incorporation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 36 (1978); REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.03, 8.05 (1984). Additionally, the shareholders may also remove the directors
with or without cause. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 39 (1978); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §
8.08 l91984).
State owned companies that have "gone public" by listing on the Chinese Exchange have
generally limited the percentage to 25% of all shares available and none have sold more than 50%,
effectively keeping control in the hands of the government, as the majority shareholder. Matthew D.
Latimer, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion of Shareholder Rights in China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097,
1106, (1994).
99 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 68.
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elected by the shareholders in accordance with the company's articles of
association, at least one employee representative elected by the employees,
and outside supervisors not affiliated with the company. 100  The Company
Law is unclear on when such a committee is required. The Law states only
that a limited liability company of a "relatively large" scale requires such a
committee. 101 How the Chinese authorities will define a company with a
"relatively large" operation remains unclear. When such a committee is
required, it has considerable power over management of the company. As
its name indicates, the committee possesses the power to supervise and
investigate many aspects of the company's affairs, including its financial
affairs.' ° 2 The committee also has the right to supervise specific acts of the
directors and managers, and presumably to take action when necessary to
prevent illegal activity by the directors and managers. 1° 3 Furthermore, the
supervisors have the power to convene the shareholders and may attend
meetings of the board of directors as non-voting delegates. 1°4  Most
interestingly, the supervisory committee can be delegated "other powers" as
stipulated in the company's articles of association.' 
0
China's hesitancy to relinquish administrative control over its
enterprises explains the creation of such a powerful supervising body. Even
though both state and privately owned companies are now supposed to
operate autonomously, the existence of supervisory committees highlights
an ongoing reluctance by the Chinese authorities to relinquish direct
control. By creating such committees and giving them broad powers, the
100 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 52. This is similar to civil law countries such as Germany,
where a Supervising board is elected by the shareholders, and is limited to larger corporations. See
COMMON MARKET REPORTS: GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, 11-12 (Friedrich K. Juenger & Lajos
Schmidt irans., 1967); Donna Shook-Wiercimok et al., Germany,. in SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY: THE
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 177-91 (Dennis Campbell & Jennifer
Powers eds., 1993).
101 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 52.
102 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 54.
103 Article 54 of the Law is somewhat confusingly worded to state that a supervisory committee or
supervisors shall have the right to "supervise acts conducted by directors and managers during the
performance of their duties which are in violation of the law, statutory regulations or the Company's
articles of association." The author believes that the intent of the Law is not for the supervisors to be sure
that directors and managers are actually performing tasks in violation of the law, rather, they have the
ability to take action should a director or manager act in violation of a law or statue. COMPANY LAW, supra
note 5, art. 54.
104 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 54.
105 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 54. This last provision can vest extraordinary powers in this
committee.
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government can continue to influence the operation of the larger companies
through placement of administrative bureaucrats in the supervisory
committees even when it loses its controlling interest in the companies.
1°6
Since the Law does not require that the supervisors have any expertise or
understanding of the company's business, the type of problems encountered
when bureaucrats were directing the production and operational aspects of
the Chinese enterprises could well appear with the new limited liability
companies.
In addition to not requiring that the supervisors be experts in their
fields, another glaring omission of the Company Law is the lack of
meaningful restrictions on the supervisors' activities. Article 59 requires
that directors, supervisors, and managers not profit personally from the
positions by acceptances of bribes or other illicit gains, I1 7 but the
prohibition of directors and managers from engaging in activities which
constitute embezzlement or conflicts of interest, in articles 60 and 61, does
not extend to supervisors. I°8 Therefore, while a director or manager owes a
fiduciary duty to the company, a supervisor has the power to supervise the
activities and interfere in the operation of the company without similarly
owing the company any duty of loyalty. 109  If China intended the
supervisors to monitor the activities of the management, it has neglected to
watch the monitors. This omission of the supervisor from articles 60 and 61
should be remedied at the earliest opportunity by an amendment to the Law.
To monitor corporate activities, China could adopt mechanisms
currently used in other markets. For example, stock markets and securities
commissions can regulate such behavior as insider trading and stock
manipulations by management. Outside creditors can also monitor the
decisions of the management for profit maximization. Boards of directors
can monitor management and respond to inefficiency by firing and hiring.
The existence of a supervising board with broad powers will frustrate the
desired market efficiency if the supervisors are not familiar with the
company's business and have no incentive to see the company profit.
106 The Law is completely devoid of provisions which protect the interest of minority investors
from the manipulation of the majority shareholder.
107 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 59.
108 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, arts. 60, 61.
109 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 61.
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3. Management Decisions
a. The Decision Making Process
For a business to operate under true market principles, concern over
profit and efficiency should override considerations of public policy and
state welfare. Some might argue that public welfare should be an integral
part of corporate decision making," 0 but in China, the enterprises have not
enjoyed the opportunity of this debate as politics overshadowed all of the
decisions made. This author would suggest that for China to enjoy the
benefits of efficient management decisions, public policy should be at most
a partial consideration in determining the best decisions for a corporation.
Ideally, management decisions of the company should be made independent
of politics.
Unfortunately, for the past four decades, the Chinese political and
social systems have discouraged independent management decisions.
During the Cultural Revolution, people learned that if they spoke out or
made a suggestion, their words could be misinterpreted or twisted and used
as weapons to attack them during subsequent political campaigns. I I If a
manager made an innovative decision to improve production, he or she
might well be accused of borrowing from the -capitalist system 1 12 and,
despite production increases, be punished for such innovation. In addition
to active repression of innovation, China's iron rice bowl system of life-
tenured employment also discourages creative thinking on the part of
managers or workers.
As a result of the fears of political reprisal and poor matching of
skills to jobs, China's enterprises suffer from a severe shortage of
management talent. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, China
recognized the need for professional management skills and began training
managers in business schools. A few students were sent abroad to be
educated in the United States or European business schools. Many of these
students did not return to China and the knowledge they acquired abroad
110 See Hazel Henderson, The Challenge of Decision Making in the Solar Age, in CORPORATIONS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: How SHOULD DECISIONS BE MADE? (David L. Brunner et al. eds., 198 1); PAUL R.
CONE et al., STRATEGIC RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1, 51-66 (1986); IRA M. MILLSTEIN & SALEM M.
KATSH, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 229-57 (1981).
III K. H. FAN, THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 186-87 (1968).
112 Id., at 166; See GREGOR, supra note 3, at 79.
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was lost to the Chinese enterprise. 113 The government's handling of student
protests in June of 1989 did nothing to encourage Chinese students abroad
to return."
4
Unable to utilize the students' knowledge, China has taken other
measures to fill its management gap. In the beginning, the government felt
that many skills would be acquired through the Sino-foreign joint ventures.
However, the limited number of such ventures kept the total number of
initiates small. More recently, China is taking affirmative steps to ensure
more managers are trained abroad and that they return to manage enterprises
in China. China also hopes that the Company Law, along with a new
openness to investment from Western nations and Asia (including Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan where fewer differences in language and
management style exist) will help the country to quickly build its base of
professional managers.
Under the Western corporate model as it is followed in the United
States, the board sets the general direction for the company, but managers
are essentially free to make day-to-day decisions without interference. In
practice, the management team makes recommendations to the board which
are typically rubber-stamped, so management wields almost absolute power.
Stockholders are so far removed from day-to-day affairs as to be nearly
irrelevant.116  In countries such as Japan and Germany, management also
exercises tremendous control over the day to day affairs of the corporation,
113 It is estimated only one out of three students sent abroad ever return. In an effort to attract these
students back, China has begun to offer tax incentives and job offerings. Josephine Ma, Overseas
Educated Enticed to Return Home, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, SCHINA File.
114 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12 at 18.
115 For example, the City of Shanghai has an ongoing management program with the City of San
Francisco. Every two years, managers from various enterprises are selected to undergo a one and half year
training course in China on all aspects of the business including marketing, financing and accounting. At
the end of the classes, the managers come to the United States to be placed with U.S. companies to observe
and learn about U.S. management practices. This management training has returned to Shanghai hundreds
of mid-level managers who have since been promoted to positions of importance over the years. For most,
the critical lesson was not the acquisition of technical expertise, but being able to practice management in a
capitalist environment where efficient decision making is prized. Interview with Philip Boyle, former
Chair of Business Program, San Francisco-Shanghai Sister Cities Committee.
116 In the United States, the most famous proponents of this theory are Berle and Means. See
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 93.
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with monitoring of major manafement decisions done by the board, banks
and other institutional investors.
Under the Chinese Company Law, although the board of directors
oversees many aspects of a company's daily operations, the board is
ultimately answerable to the shareholders' board. If the company is
privately owned, then the system can work efficiently. Where the company
is wholly owned by the State, the administrative organ in charge of the
company directly controls the board of directors by appointment." 8  As
added insurance, the supervisory committee can use its power to force
decisions to conform to official government policies. No matter how
skillful the new managers are, their decisions would be subject to constant
bureaucratic interference. The Company Law fails to change the line of
traditional authority and to encourage an efficient decision making process.
Furthermore, managers will always worry that if the political winds
change and China begins another political campaign such as the one it
waged in the 1980's on "spiritual pollution,"'"19 innovative managers would
be the target of attacks for bringing Western style management to the
Chinese socialist enterprises. Such political campaigns tend to steamroller
over people, and the fact that the management skills may well have been
acquired at the government's direction and indeed sponsorship would be of
little avail. Accordingly, Chinese managers bear the risks of their bad
decisions, especially political ones, but do not necessarily benefit directly
from good decisions.
For China to attract and utilize the best management talents, one
critical element is the need to assure managers that while they must bear the
negative consequences of their economic decisions, they will not be
subjected to second guessing of their management decisions based the
government's political agenda. While managerial talents may be willing to
risk their jobs due to bad management decisions, the idea that making
politically incorrect decisions may be punished will cause most managers to
be so risk adverse as to be afraid of making decisions.
117 For a discussion of Japanese corporate governance, see ZENICHI SHISHIDO, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN (1994).
118 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 66.
119 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 100. The campaign denounced all Western influences on
Chinese culture imported since 1978, with the targets ranging from taste in popular music to increase in
prostitution.
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b. Management Incentives
Another vacuum which currently exists in Chinese enterprises, and
which the Company Law does not address is a system of incentives for
those making management decisions. Capitalist society rewards owner-
managers with a return in capital for wise and efficient decisions. Board
managed or manager-managed enterprises in the same capitalist model often
use a mixed package of stock incentives and salary increases and bonuses
based on the performance of the company. 120 In China, assuming that
performance of a company can be measured, the incentive to make
decisions which promote the well-being of the company, in contrast to the
individual decision maker, is absent. Where a Chinese company is actually
owned by individual investors, and management decisions are made free
from bureaucratic interference, then the incentives do exist.
However, under the Company Law a great majority of the shares in
the companies will be in the hands of the State, and the state representative
has at least two interests which 'may conflict: the interest of the company
and that of the state. For example, take the most fundamental of business
goals: maximizing profits. For an individual owner, if taxes can be avoided
legally, there is every incentive to do so. In contrast, for a representative of
the State, minimizing taxes for the company results in less income for the
State, his or her employer. The representative's decision may depend on
such factors whether his or her salary is allocated from funds directly tied to
the profits of the company or from a general fund representing the amount
of tax revenues the government collects, which might lead to a decision
which is inefficient for the company.
A less-than altruistic government employee may have even more
conflicting interests in addition to those of the company and the
government, such as self-interest and interests of those who can afford a
bribe. In these instances, decisions may well be made based on the amount
of bribery received or other benefit promised, totally inconsistent with
either the interest of the company or the government. 121
120 For a discussion of management incentives and how they operate in the United States, see Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUMB. L. REv. 1416, 1419-1421
(1989).
121 Corruption in China is a rampant and pervasive phenomenon. Business is often done by either
outright bribery or use of "connections" (Guan xt) to pressure the officials in charge of the approval
process into approving an unsound transaction. Despite recent crackdown on corruption and prosecution
of high officials on corruption charges, corruption remains a major problem with doing business in China.
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Chinese managers, especially those who are strictly employees, have
even less incentive than managers elsewhere to act in the interest of the
company. Bad managers in the Western corporate world are replaced and
their reputations as poor managers will most likely spread in the business
community, foreclosing future employment opportunities. In China, the
vestiges of the "iron rice bowl" syndrome linger, and bad managers are
often retained, but given less decision making power. This practice leads to
inefficiency for the company: paying for an employee who is not
contributing to the overall profitability of the company. If the new
corporations in China are to achieve maximum economic efficiency,
managers who are professionally trained, and whose interest is closely tied
to the welfare of corporations, should be installed at all levels of the
corporation. More specifically, manager compensation and continuing
employment should be tied directly to the profitability of the company. The
State, as the shareholder, should remain as passive as possible and only
intervene when major decisions are being considered. Similarly, the state
should judge these decisions as a private shareholder would, rather than
confusing other public policy considerations with the goal of profit
maximization. 1
22
B. External Challenges
1. Administrative Controls
Article 67 of the Law, stating that the assets of a state wholly owned
company will be under the supervision of the government authorized
investment body or departments, is troubling. 123  Presumably, the Law
intends that whichever state agency originally owned the company before
its transformation into a "limited liability company" will have the ability to
supervise and administer the enterprise's activities. This provision clearly
China's People Detest Graft But Pay Bribes, REUTER WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library; REUWLD File; China's Leader Calls For Corruption Crackdown, UPI, Nov. 29, 1994,
available in, LEXIS, ASIAPC library, UPI File.
122 This is not to suggest that the state should abandon its public function. Rather, the author
suggests that the instrument to achieve these policy considerations not be thorough interference with the
internal functions of the enterprise as owners. Instead, the government should implement its public
policies through separate legislation. For example, if full employment is a public concern, the government
should not, as an owner of the enterprise, force hiring or retention of unproductive workers, instead, it can
legislate programs for re-educating of redundant workers or provide unemployment insurance.
123 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 67.
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defeats the original purpose for enacting the Company Law-to allow
companies to make responsible economic decisions relying upon market
rather than political factors. China's administrative organs clearly lack the
information necessary to properly decide the variety, quantity and price of
products, and how much to allocate to the Chinese and international
markets. 24 The separation of these enterprises from the state administrative
organs was intended to allow the enterprises to operate autonomously.
Article 67 potentially defeats those purposes. An alternative view would be
that article 67 perfectly accomplishes the government's goal of keeping
control.
In practice, the degree of supervision (or interference) could vary
vastly from enterprise to enterprise. But as long as such interference is
possible, the enterprise will not be able to function independently whether it
remains a "state-owned enterprise" or becomes a separately incorporated
LLC. The one exception is that when a "large state-owned company has
demonstrated good business circumstances and sound business
management, it may be empowered to exercise rights of ownership of assets
by the State Council.' 2 5 However, it is unclear when a company will be
considered to have demonstrated sufficiently sound business management
and judgment so that it will be allowed to freely exercise the rights of
ownership. Even if such a company obtains its rights, there is nothing in the
Law to prevent the State Council or the administrative organizations which
are in charge of the company from suddenly retracting these rights or
exercising them on behalf of the enterprise. Also, since this privilege to
exercise the rights of ownership is only limited to large scale companies,
most of the medium-sized, state-owned companies will remain under the
direct control of the administrative organs.
Article 67 further reflects China's intent to continue administrative
supervision of the country's various enterprises. If the interference by these
administrative organs reaches to the level of production, pricing and labor
policies, then the independence of these enterprises is completely illusory.
2. Conflicting Orders - Too Many "Mothers-in-Law"
124 See note 47, supra, and accompanying text.
125 COMPANy LAW, supra note 5, art. 72.
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Despite provisions in the Chinese Constitution to' the contrary, the
confusing and often overlapping lines of authority remains a problematicS 126
issue facing China's enterprises. Every Chinese enterprise must respond
to the orders of several administrative organs at any given time. For
example, a factory which produces petroleum products would be under the
direct supervision of the Ministry of Petroleum. Additionally, the local
Labor Bureau would be in charge of the allocation of workers to a factory,
while decisions regarding exports from the factory are made by the state
Import-Export Corporation in charge of the products of the enterprise.
127
This type of interference is not regulatory, as in other nations, but direct
intervention by the bureaucrats who staff each of these administrative
organs. These bureaucrats rarely have the expertise or incentive to properly
supervise the various enterprises for which they are responsible since their
expertise is administrative, not technical or managerial. Coordination
among these administrative agencies is also notoriously poor.
In addition, Chinese enterprises often suffer under multiple
administrative orders. The enterprise may receive one set of orders from the
central government and yet another set from the provincial or local
authorities. 12  These different sets of orders may not be the same, and, in
fact, they often conflict. With all of these "Mothers-in-Law" telling them
what to do, enterprises often spend much of their time avoiding or
circumventing orders rather than complying with them. 129
As a consequence, enterprises have developed a philosophy that
government orders should be circumvented and not followed. 130 Any
cohesion in planning and coordinating the various administrative agencies is
lost by the efforts of the enterprises to avoid these top-down orders. One
example of such avoidance of central orders is for enterprises to break one
large project into small parts so the cost of each part falls below the amount
126 Article 16 of the Chinese Constitution states that a state-owned enterprise shall have power to
make its own decisions. P.R.C. CONST., art. 16.
127 All import and export of Chinese products are under the auspices of Chinese state authorized
import-export corporations and their local branches. For example, all petroleum by-products would fall
under the China National Petroleum By-Products Import-Export Cooperation and all handicraft would be
under the control of China National Handicraft Import-Export Corporation.
128 See generally CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15 at 144. See also, Chen, Planning
Supply and Marketing, in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 162-67, 180.
129 In China, the phrase "popo duo" or "too many mothers-in-law" is used to describe the numerous
administrative and bureaucratic controls faced by Chinese enterprises. See HSU, supra note 23, at 88;
Chen, Planning Supply and Marketing in CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM, supra note 15, at 44, 162.
130 See generally ZHOU supra note 3, at 44.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
which a project will require central government approval. l1 l  Many
limitations on the decision-making powers of particular enterprises are
codified in the statutes which govern them. For example, numerous articles
in the "Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the People"'132 set forth
limitations on the management powers of the enterprises.
The Company Law does not make any attempt to streamline these
various administrative organs. In fact, some questions have already arisen
as to how many approvals a Sino-foreign joint venture which is also limited
liability company must obtain and who has the authority to grant them.133
3. Political Control
In almost all aspects of Chinese society, political control is of
paramount importance because control ensures stability and perpetuation of
those people in power. Without control, there is fear that the booming
economy and the introduction of Western ideas may well "corrupt" the
Chinese people. 134  By carefully controlling change, the Chinese
Communist Party hopes to maintain its power. The question is, will the
Party continue to support these changes in the long run if its grip begins to
loosen? In the past, when a program or a particular legislation enjoyed
sustained support from the Party, changes were brought about rapidly.135
Similarly, when there is a shift in government policy and the support is
withdrawn, the demise of the program can be equally rapid. 136  Chinese
131 Singh, supra note 20, at 22.
132 Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, reprinted in CHINA L. FOREIGN
Bus. (CCH Austl.) 13-534, arts. 44, 50, 55 (1988).
133 This question was posed by a U.S. business person at a conference sponsored by the 1990
Institute entitled "China Foreign Trade and Investment Laws" held in San Francisco on March 24 and 25,1995, and was directed at a high-level Chinese official from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Trade andCooperation (MOFTEC). The official was unable to answer. Ostensibly, a Sino-foreign joint venture
contract is under the supervision of MOFTEC. The Company Law, on the other hand, specifies the StateAdministration for Industry and Commerce and other "relevant state authority" for approval. COMPANY
LAW, art. 19.
134 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 72.
135 When China wanted to encourage the development of small private businesses in the early
1980's, it allowed the establishment of getihu or individually owned business. Bank loans and licenses
were freely available to individuals who wanted to set up their own businesses, usually in the service sector
such as tailoring, shoe repair, etc. SUSAN YOUNG, PRIVATE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA
15-16, (1995).
136 For example, when the private sector grew and began to compete with the government
enterprises, officials who disliked the proliferation of the private businesses would demand the removal of
the businesses from their vicinity by launching "environment beautification campaigns." Id. at 76.
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society has traditionally followed orders from the top, and the people are
used to massive and sometimes 180 degree changes from one program to
another. 1
37
If China, due to changes in leadership or policy, decides to revert to a
more communist system and abolish private ownership, the owners of the
private companies will undoubtedly lose much. Such change has already
happened once before in recent Chinese history. After the Communist
takeover of mainland China in 1949, officials purported to allow private
ownership.' 38  Many capitalists stayed in China, believing in the
government's support of private ownership. 139 However, as the Chinese
Communist party strengthened its hold on China in the early 1950s, such
private holdings were systematically seized and converted to public
ownership. Bearing this in mind, the new class of entrepreneurs and
capitalists in China should be cautious. Until the government marches
irrevocably down the path to privatization, the dangers of losing one's
investment is always present when investing in these newly formed
companies. 141
4. Interpretation of the Law
For any law to be effective in China, it must be enforced by the
bureaucrats who interpret and apply the law. Because of China's cautious
approach to legislation, laws are often drafted to reflect its broad policy, and
specific interpretation is left to the bureaucrats. This practice allows shifts
and adjustment of policy without the need to amend the law. If the
bureaucrats support the Company Law, they can make the formation and
operation of companies relatively smooth and efficient. On the other hand,
if the bureaucracy decides that such a law is undesirable, for whatever
reason, it can, through various bureaucratic means, make the registration of
137 Despite the irrationality of such swings, the pattern repeats over and over. For a discussion of
the phenomenon, see ZHOU, supra note 3, at 15.
138 See generally FREDERICK C. TEIWES, POLITICS & PURGES IN CHINA: RECTIFICATION AND THE
DECLINE OF PARTY NORMS 1950-1965, 87-108, (1979).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 China's experience with privatization in the agricultural and service sector can teach valuable
lessons to the larger industries. See infira note 181. See also, e.g., Liu Jisheng, The Reform of State-Owned
Enterprises, in CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM (Timothy King and Zhang Jiping. eds.,
1992).
JULY 1996
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
a company and its operation extremely difficult. Applications can be
misplaced, requests for more details can be made repeatedly, and rejection
can be groundless. Therefore, successful operation of these newly created
companies will operate effectively will depend largely on the officials
responsible for interpreting and applying the Company Law. Even if the
central government does not totally reverse policy and reassert control of
these newly corporatized enterprises, interference by bureaucracy could
easily stifle, and ultimately kill, maturing companies just learning about the
market system.
5. Approval Process
The approval process to decide whether or not a company may be
established may well be subject to pressures similar to those placed on the
Chinese banks. 142  For example, if a ministry is interested in one of its
enterprises obtaining LLC status, it may pressure the agency in charge of
approving the application for registration. Therefore, in anticipation of such
a possibility, the Company Law requires that failure to comply with
registration requirements due to pressures from a "higher level" will result
in liability to the departments responsible for registration.1 43  Such
departments are subject to administrative punishments and, in serious cases,
criminal liabilities. 144
Article 223 is a rare official recognition by the Chinese government
that such pressure tactics are prevalent in China. Authorities have often
been known to exert influence to get projects they favor approved, or to get
special treatment for pet enterprises. It is precisely these tactics which have
caused Chinese banks to finance numerous projects which would not
142 While China passed a set of regulations on the registration of the companies outlining details for
more advance approvals (article 14), documentation for actual registration (article 17) subsequent changes(articles 23-35), and its eventual dissolution (articles 36-38), the decision to approve does not rest
exclusively with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and its local chapters. Instead, the
regulation refers to various unspecified "relevant laws and regulations" which may require that "certain
items" be submitted to a "relevant" state authority for examination and approval prior to the
commencement of the registration process. COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 19. It is this type of
ambiguous language which provides opportunities for random exercises of administrative discretion. SeeAdministrative Rules of the People's Republic of China Governing the Registration of Companies, supra
note 10.
143 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 233.
144 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 233.
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otherwise merit the funds. 45  The Company Law's recognition of the
problem and the provided solution are important steps in ensuring that the
authorities responsible for the regulation of companies exercise independent
decision making powers.
The Company Law perhaps could further ensure the unbiased
examination of companies by imposing liability on actual individuals in
high government positions. This would more effectively prevent high
officials from exerting pressure on departments responsible for registering a
company. For example, if relatives of a high official attempt to form a
company but find themselves unable to comply with all of the statutory
requirements, the official may exert pressure on the registering department.
In such an event, the Chinese courts should apply article 223 by analogy
and find such individuals directly liable for the damages which result from
improper registration of a company. Personal liability would be a far more
effective deterrent than sanctions against the official department. Approvals
which are obtained by exercising unsound administrative discretion will
lend to the existence of unsound corporations. Specifying a standard for an
enterprise to incorporate and minimizing bureaucratic discretion will go a
long way towards elimination of this problem.
If the above issues are not resolved, private enterprises and any
efficiency they may bring to the Chinese economy will be short-lived. The
failure of these enterprises may also trigger the very social and political
unrest which the Chinese leadership fears. Should China fail to make a
timely transition into a market economy, two possible consequences may
result. If reform does not achieve the economic benefits quickly, the
Chinese people may push for a more rapid pace of economic reform. The
government may respond by reverting back to a system of a rigidly planned
economy if it fears that rapid reforms will erode its power. This would
bring about the potential of civil unrest and possibly a revolution. Even if
the Chinese populace accepts this reversal, it could lead to the withdrawal of
foreign investments (which have only entered China in the past fifteen
years), the retrenchment of any political reform, and the inability of China
to emerge as a fully participating member of the world economy.146Alternatively, instead of open rebellion, the Chinese people could chart their
145 Singh, supra note 20, at xiv-xv.
146 China has applied to join GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization and any such
reversal of economic policies may well jeopardize its application.
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own economic course by subverting and disregarding official policies. 147
This could lead to official central government dictating one policy and the
regional and municipal governments implementing another, leading to
chaos and uncertainty. Neither of these options is desirable from the
perspective the those currently in power. To maintain power and stability,
the Chinese government desires to see changes restricted to the economic
sphere without jeopardizing its own political power and without unduly
changing the Chinese society. The following section suggests changes
which need to be made for China to fully enjoy the benefits of the Company
Law.
IV. INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PRIVATIZATION
Although the Company Law provides a framework for Chinese
enterprises to assume a corporate structure, it is silent on how and whether
the ownership of the enterprises is to pass from state hands into private
ones. Perhaps the most significant failure of the Company Law is that
while it provides a mechanism for the incorporation of existing Chinese
enterprises, it is silent on how these same enterprises would transform from
state ownership to private ownership. 148 Until privatization is achieved, the
state as the owner must entrust management to the same bureaucrats who
still cling to the tradition of life long employment and who lack economic
incentives to operate the enterprise efficiently. While the possibility of
privatization exists in the Company Law, 149 the means to achieve it are
absent. Since China has not demonstrated a willingness to hand out shares
of the state-owned enterprises free, the desirability of investing in these
state-owned Chinese enterprises must be examined. Numerous aspects of
the Company Law makes investing in these enterprises unattractive.
147 There are already signs of provinces and municipal government, especially in the South, which
are disregarding central government directives and promoting much more liberal economic policies. Deng
Urged to Implement Reforms. UPI, Aug. 22, 1995, available in, LEXIS, ASIAPIC Library, UPI file;
Beijing and the Regions; Guangdong Governor Denies Hindering Central Decrees BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 17, 1995, available in, LEXIS, ASIAPC library, BBCSWB file.
148 In fact, the Law specifically contemplates enterprises which are wholly state owned and sets out
rules on how it becomes a limited liability company under the Law. See COMPANY LAW, supra note 5,
arts. 7, 21, 66-69, 72.
149 In all of the literature accompanying the Company Law as well as the related regulations, the
Chinese authorities have never indicated that privatization was a goal. Rather, the Company Law is treated
as the means to reorganize the state-owned enterprises to face market challenges. David Ho, China's New
Company Law: Something Concrete to Go By, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1994, at 9.
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A. Increase in Stock Price
To have a truly market-oriented, privately-owned enterprise, owners
must have an incentive to invest in the company. At present, private
investment in China takes the limited form of individuals buying shares of
stocks traded on China's stock exchanges. The issuance of such shares are
limited and are carefully scrutinized by the government before the public
offering. The Chinese investor's mentality is rarely one of investing in a
company for its future growth. Rather, investment in China's stock market
is very speculative and is intended to take advantage of the phenomenon
that the demand for shares far exceeds the availability of shares.
150
Therefore, artificial speculations tend to push up the prices of the stocks
well beyond their worth. 15 1 It is not uncommon for a stock that has been
issued at ten yuan (about US$1.25) to increase its value ten fold or 100 fold
within a few days due to excessive demand. 152  With such hyperactivity,
inevitably, the stock will drop in value just as quickly as it rose.153
Incidences of suicide by unsophisticated investors who have lost their life
savings are becoming more common in China.
154
It is believed that average Chinese households have tremendous
savings which would allow them to invest the savings as capital in
150 See Andrew Browne, China Goes Slow on Stock Expansion, REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC BUS. REP.,
Nov. 28, 1994 (indicating 288 listed companies with a total market capitalization of approximately 90
billion yuan).
151 See Roller-Coaster Ride, China is Trying to Curb Volatility and Entice More Investors, ASIA
WEEK, Nov. 30, 1994, at 49 (supporting "volatility" as the byword for China's stock markets because of
their vulnerability to manipulation by large institutional investors who ferment speculation, spread rumors,
and distort government pronouncements and policy).
152 See Hisakuni Yonekuri, Shanghai Stock Market in Vanguard of Chinese Reforms, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, July 20, 1992, available in, LEXIS, ASIAPC library, JEN file (reporting the market increased
twenty times over one and one-half years, with some shares rising as much as 100 fold).
153 See The Dangers of Succumbing to "Emerging Market Mania, " BUS. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at
16 (noting Shanghai stock market soared to more than 10,000 in February 1992, fell to approximately
1,740 in July 1994, and rose again in August 1994 to over 3,700).
154 See Andrew Browne, China Stocks Surge as Rescue Package Unveiled, REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC
BUS. REP., Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, REUAPB file (discussing the media
reports of suicides as a result of despair over market losses); China's Shanghai Bourse Claims Second
Suicide, REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC BUS. REP., July 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, REUAPB
file (stating the speculation resulting in on suicide in May 1992 and another in July 1992); Chinese Woman
Commits Suicide Over Stock Losses, AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC library, AFP file (reporting woman lost life savings speculating in stocks); Failed Chinese
Investor Leaps to His Death, REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC BUS. REP., Nov. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
library, REUAPB file (confirming suicide of investor after serious losses in stock market).
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enterprises.15 5 Unfortunately, these same investors lack the sophistication
and the knowledge about investment for the purpose of growth as opposed
to speculation. Instead, most Chinese would rather put their money into
something tangible such as gold than in a company they can neither touch
or hold.' 56  Until a pool of true "capitalists" emerges at the core level of
Chinese society, investments in corporations will continue to come
primarily from government sources and foreign investors. As a result, the
type of enterprises that these investors would most likely support will
continue to be skewed toward government priorities and exports rather than
the needs of the Chinese domestic market.
B. Reserve Funds/Dividends
A unique feature of operating as a Chinese company is the
requirement that the company allocate a certain percentage of its profits into
a mandatory accumulation fund'57 and a fund for "official public
welfare."' 158 The Law requires almost twenty percent of profits be put into
these accumulation funds. Therefore, an investor in a Chinese company
may need to wait much longer for significantly smaller dividends than an
investor in a similarly profitable company in the United States. 159
The Chinese Company Law is also quite conservative regarding the
declaration of dividends. All past losses must be paid up before any
1607dividends may be paid.   Nimble dividends are not allowed.''
155 David Roche, How China Can Secure Its Future, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995. The
savings rate is estimated to be 40% of the GNP; Andrew Browne, China Plays Cat-and-Mouse With
Futures Traders, REUTER WORLD SERVICE, Mar. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS library, TXTNEWS
file.
156 See Tony Walker, The Chinese Go for Gold- Why the Authorities are Encouraging the
Traditional Love of the Most Precious Metals, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at 3 (since 1984 gold
consumption has increased an average of 20% per year, and the Chinese are encouraged to purchase gold
as a form of savings); Richard Warren, Demand Tails Offas Price Rises, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
18, 1994, at S I (demand in Greater China increased for the second successive quarter despite gold prices).
157 This accumulation fund is much like an earned reserve account, with the difference that the
reserve is mandatory until the fund is in excess of 50% of the company's registered capital. COMPANY
LAW, supra note 5, art. 177.
158 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 177.
159 While there is no requirement that a profitable United States company distribute its profits in the
form of dividends, companies will generally do so to keep investors satisfied and stock prices high.
160 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 177.
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Interestingly, the distribution of profits in a limited liability company is
almost like a limited partnership in the United States. The distribution of
profits is according to the percentages of contributed capital by the
shareholders, not according to their shareholdings. 162 For example, if one
party contributes more capital and receives the same number of shares as
the other, profit distribution would be in accordance with that individual's
contributed capital as opposed to the number of shares received. For
companies limited by shares, distribution is in accordance with the
shareholders' shares.'
63
China's Company Law lacks the flexibility of its United States
counterparts in that it does not provide for different classes of stock with
different voting or dividend rights. The Law is silent regarding the
corporate ability to issue preferred shares and common shares. 164  The
absence of different share issues further discourages certain investors who
prefer a more certain (albeit potentially lower) return on their investment.
The Company Law also places significant restrictions on
shareholders' ability to transfer their interest in a Chinese limited liability
company. 165  In this respect, a Chinese LLC is much like a closely held
corporation in the United States. Unlike the close corporation in the United
States, however, the Chinese company does not have a choice in opting out
of these restrictions on transfer.
China's enterprises are unaccustomed to the notion of payment of
dividends based on performance. Instead, many stocks traded in China pay a
fixed rate of interest, similar to bonds in the United States.166 The Company
Law lacks rules specifically mandating distributions to shareholders, and the
Law's rules on dividends and distributions are very conservative.
16 7
Without dividends, the incentive to invest is further diminished.
161 Some states in the United States, such as Delaware, allow corporations to make a distribution in
a year where there is current earnings. The amount of the distribution can be up to the amount of current
earnings and there is no need to make up for previous year's losses. General Corp. Law of Delaware § 170.
162 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 177.
163 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 177.
164 Generally, preferred shares in a United States corporation will receive dividend payments
before common shareholders and have priority in liquidation but preferred shares may also have some
voting rights. Larry C. Sauvain, Preferred Stock, in THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES, 333,
336-37 Frank J. Fabozzi & Irving M. Pollack, eds., 1983.
165 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 35.
166 See supra note 161 on dividends.
167 See supra note 161 and accompanying text on dividends.
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C. Transferability
Limited liability companies in China are not freely traded on the
stock exchange, 16 thus eliminating investment incentives resulting from the
possibility gains when the stock is sold. Since Chinese LLCs, like close
corporations in the United States, face significant restrictions on the transfer
of shares, investors cannot easily recoup their investment by privately
selling the shares to another investor.
Furthermore, limited transferability means that once investments are
made, even the most efficient enterprises cannot easily attract investors
away from less efficient enterprises. In a capitalist market, the most
powerful tool a shareholder has to combat inefficient management is the
ability to sell his share in the company and invest elsewhere. 169  Where
transfer is limited not by choice of the investors but by government
regulations, the investor's ability to seek out the enterprise offering the best
returns is taken away. This lack of liquidity discourages potentialinvestors.
D. Emphasis on Profitability'
China's Company Law provides that certain companies may become
publicly listed companies. 171 In addition to privately held companies, the
Law envisions that a company established by a state-owned enterprise may
transform itself through a public offering if it is profitable enough. 17 2 This
profitability requirement represents a strong theme running through China's
listing requirements. Any company wishing to list its stock publicly needs
168 COMPANY LAW, supra Note 5, arts. 143-50 (P.R.C.). Although "there is no universally
recognized definition of a close corporation, there is general agreement as to its major attributes." Lack of
transferability is one such attribute. JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 683 (3rd Edition, 1989).
169 The ability to freely transfer creates an external monitoring system to keep management honest
and effective. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 120 at 1431-1432.
170 While a "close corporation" in the United States may also limit transferability, the initial choice
of entity is decided by the investors and the restrictions on transfer are often based on consideration of
compatibility of investors and maintenance of control by a specific group. The restrictions in China's
Company Law governs all corporations unless a corporation is publicly traded. Restrictions are mandatory
and the investors may not opt out of the restrictions as they are able to in the United States. COMPANY
LAW, supra note 5, art. 35.
171 COMPANY LAW, supranote 5, arts. 151-52.
172 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 152.
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to be profitable, which the Law defines as a company which must not "have
incurred losses over the last three consecutive years."' 173  Such a
requirement essentially eliminates the ability of a growing company to
access capital for funding research and development. There are numerous
examples of companies in the United States which operate at a loss for
many years, but nevertheless are publicly listed in order to gain access to
needed capital, 174 A profitable track record is only one indicator of the
success of a company, so China's rather paternalistic requirement that only
profitable companies be listed points out what may be an inherent
misunderstanding of the nature of public capital markets. It may also reflect
the Chinese authorities' cautious approach to capitalist practices.
E. Lack of Disclosure Requirement
While China has two functioning national stock exchanges, one in
Shanghai which opened in 1990, and one in Shenzen since 1991,
regulations on share issues and trading on these exchanges have been
locally formulated. Each exchange has different standards for listing and
trading. 175  Currently, a national securities law remains drafted but
unissued. 176  Disclosure requirements and anti-fraud provisions, while
available,' 77 remain vague and the penalties for violations are limited to
fines. Most importantly, while the provisional regulations call for fines
to be imposed on inside traders and others who commit fraud in relation to
stock transactions, shareholders have only limited remedies available to
them. The law does not provide for direct private suits or derivative suits
against the violators. Without a national law which clearly protects
173 COMPANY LAW, supra note 5, art. 157(4)
174 See THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER & JACK L. RIVKIN, RISK AND REWARD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S GREAT INDUSTRIES (1987).
175The two exchanges separately issued rules under the guidance of the local branches of the
People's Bank of China. The two sets of regulations were inconsistent and independent. Jacob P. Alpren,
China Issues Class B Share Rules in Effort to Set Unified Standard, ASIA WALL ST. JRL., Jan. 3, 1996, at
A20.
1761d
177See Chinese Stock Trading Regulations, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC library, BBC file. The Interim Regulations on Management of Stock Issue
and Trading ("Interim Regulations") require financial disclosure, ch.6, arts. 57-67; and prohibit certain
inside trading activities, ch.3, art. 38-40.
178Interim Regulations, supra note 177, at art. 72.
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shareholders' rights and provides them with effective remedies, investors in
China's stock market should remain wary.
V. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: THE NEXT STAGE
Beginning around 1978, China officially recognized the need to
introduce into its economy more market mechanisms to correct intrinsic
inefficiencies. China began to implement fundamental policy changes to its
strict state-planned economy in several phases. The first change was to
move from "directive planning" to "guidance planning" (Zhidao Jihua)
through a "contract responsibility system."'179 Production targets were given
to the enterprises not as goals but merely as guidelines. Enterprises which
produced more than the goal were allowed to sell the excess and retain some
of the additional profits. 18°  China first introduced this change in the
agricultural sector and has since expanded it into many industrial
operations.''
Later, in the 1980s, China introduced a financial accountability
system, whereby some manufacturing enterprises became responsible for
their own profits and losses. 8 2 Profits were to remain with the enterprises,
and taxes were to be paid to the government. Such financial accountability
led to unexpected results: enterprises did begin to care about profits, but
only short-term profits. Is3 In order to generate quick income, many Chinese
enterprises raised their prices and lowered the quality of their goods,
thereby boosting profits. Some companies engaged in speculative trade
in raw materials rather than using their allocated resources to produce goods
179 HSU, supra note 23, at 35.
180 Singh, supra note 20.
181 Under the Communist government, China's agricultural sector was based on the commune
system. The communes were dissolved with the introduction of the "responsibility" system. Agricultural
production was redivided amongst family as well as private groupings of farmers into collective and
private enterprises. These new enterprises are now responsible for the profits and losses of the land
assigned. The new allocation of land has brought significant improvements to agricultural production and
prosperity to many individual farmers. ZHOUt, supra note 3, at 5-8; see also Gu, supra note 58 at 39-41;
HSU, supra note 23, at 35.
182 See Chen, supra note 15, at 172-73; ZHOU, supra note 3 at 6-7. Mostly, these changes were
restricted to light industries.
183 See generally Liu, The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, in CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE
ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 141.
184 See Liu, The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, in CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM, supra note 141, at 93-95.
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as originally intended. 185  Then, as soon as profits were generated, large
bonuses were distributed to workers and management so that less taxes
would be paid to the government. 186  Since everyone in China was aware
that these economic and political policies might change at any moment,
managers neglected to plan on a long-term basis or to reserve funds for
future expansion.
187
This period of financial accountability actually generated high
inflation and a lower quality of goods overall. Wages increased
dramatically, but did not necessarily reflect a rise in prices or
188productivity. Black market trading in certain goods became prevalent,
and corruption was rampant. 189 To address the resulting chaos, the Chinese
government reacted in 1988 with a policy of restricting growth through
"austerity measures." 190  Authority to control production and distribution
185 See generally Liu, The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, in CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE
ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 141.
186 See Liu, The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, in CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM, supra note 141, at 91.
187 See Chen, supra note 15, at 170-74.
188 Louise de Rosario, China on the Boil, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 29, 1987, at 76-77, available in
LEXIS, BUSFIN library, ABI file.
189 See Gu, supra note 58, at 167-69. Compare DwIGHT H. PERKINS, CHINA: ASIA'S NEXT
ECONOMIC GIANT? 65-67 (1986) (concluding that "corruption" is in many cases the critical rationalizing
force which keeps China's system from grinding to a halt).
190 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 82-85. The twenty austerity measures are: (1) reduce
investment in capital construction, (2) reduce group purchases, (3) keep growth and consumption funds
under control, (4) stabilize financial markets, (5) adopt measures to increase savings, (6) consolidate
administrative companies, (7) special management to farm capital goods, especially chemicals, fertilizers,
and pesticides, (8) strengthening management of grain markets, (9) prevent hoarding and speculation, (10)
increase management control of rolled steel and non-ferrous metals markets, (I1) decrease exports of
sought after commodities, (12) decrease imports of cigarettes and liquors, (13) increase pace of housing
reform, (14) encourage enterprises to issue shares to workers in order to take the pressure off consumption,
(15) increase workers "sense of responsibilities in loving their factories," (16) implement the rule which
allows for the transfer of land use rights, (17) implement the rule which allows managers the right to make
optimal use of labor,* (18) conduct annual financial inspections, (19) enforce tax management, and (20)
increase control over foreign debt. Id. at 83.
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was markedly curtailed at the enterprise level. 19 1 Central planning was re-
emphasized to a limited extent.'
92
The problems which occurred during China's "financial
accountability" experiment demonstrates what can result when China
introduces only one aspect of capitalism, such as financial accountability,
into its socialist system without changing other factors which affect the
economy. The affected organizations quickly learned how to squeeze
maximum short-term advantage out of the change, knowing that loopholes
and opportunities for personal profiteering would be shut down in
subsequent changes in law and policy. The cumulative effect of the
profiteering quickly became overwhelming, and the government was forced
to take "corrective measures." These regular pendulum swings in Chinese
government policy have become the one constant on which the citizenry can
depend. 193  A saying has emerged to describe this phenomenon:
"Enterprises die as soon as they are controlled, there is chaos as soon as
they are released, as soon as there is chaos they are controlled again, and as
soon as they are controlled they die again." (Yi tongjui si, yifangjiu luan,
yi luan you tong, yi tong you s). 194
Success in the government's early experiments with a return to
private ownership is evident in the service industry. Businesses such as
restaurants, shoe repairs, tailors, and similar service industries are
increasingly owned and operated as private enterprises.1 95  Most of these
191 Some may argue that the control of production never left central government planning.
Although China instituted the "Contract System" where the enterprises enter into contracts with the
government for amount of production, the fact that the other party is the government led only to
dependence on these contracts and the terms arrived at were often dictated by the government bureaus. At
least two Chinese authors have argued that the contract system merely shifted control from central
government to provincial and regional government. See generally Liu, supra note 14 1, at 98-99.
192 The "party line" on the need for appropriate levels of centralization is discussed by Sun Qing
Hai and Sun Shang Qing in China's Economic Development and Reform: Achievements, Problems and
Prospects in THE END OF PLANNING? SOCIALIST ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: THE CASES OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION 72-76 (David M. Kemme & Claire E.
Gordon, eds. 1990).
193 On March 6, 1995, China's leaders admitted that economic mistakes were made in recent years.
Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese Leader Says "Mistakes " by Gov 't Fueled Inflation, N.Y. TIMES., Mar. 6, 1995, at
Al. In response, the government will take corrective steps to curb inflation. Id.
194 See FEWSMITH, supra note 43, at 66.
195 It is difficult to calculate the precise percentage of the service sector which is in private hands.
Chinese state owned enterprises have traditionally combined services such as repairs into manufacturing
enterprises to avoid the appearance of exploiting others' labor. Singh, supra note 20, at 9. Under Marxism,
repairs were accepted if the enterprise also produced the original item. "Pure" service, such as at a repair
shop, would be unacceptable. Services such as cleaning and mending were virtually eliminated.
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private enterprises are owned and operated either as sole proprietorships or
family partnerships. 196
By moving relatively slowly and allowing the development of private
enterprise only in strictly controlled sectors, the government has maintained
tight control of the economy. For example, privately held companies may
not engage in the defense industry, banking, dealing with goods under State
monopoly, or any other operation which is prohibited by the State. 197 Even
in those sectors which have been allowed private ownership, the
government has managed, through taxation and police activities, to keep
private enterprises on a tight rein while enjoying the benefits of the owners'
creativity and entrepreneurism.198
In contrast, the largest and most important industries in China, such
as transportation, telecommunications, and exploration of natural resource
such as oil and coal, are still primarily under State control. 199 As a result,
they remained largely immune to recent moves towards marketization. The
need to control this sector of the economy results from significant national
concerns. While the author recognizes the desire of maintaining control
over key industries, certain changes which could be implemented in non-
vital sectors would go a long way towards a successful implementation of
the Company Law. A list of remaining problems follows, together with
some suggested changes for each sector.
196 Although China's Civil Code recognizes these forms of business, there is currently no specific
law governing their formation, structure, or liability. CIVIL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
reprinted in CHINA L. FOREIGN BUS. (CCH Austl.) 19-150, arts. 4, 5 (1986).
197 PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, reprinted
in CHINA L. FOREIGN BUS. (CCH Austl.) 13-546 (approved by the State Council on June 3, 1988,
promulgated on June 25, 1988, and effective July 1, 1988).
198 The existence of the private sector has not been without controversy. For a detailed discussion
of the evolution of the private enterprise in China, see generally, Susan Young, PRIVATE BUSINESS AND
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, supra note 135.
199 Although there has been a steady shift from state-owned entities to other forms since 1978, the
affected enterprises have been light industries such as textiles, food processing, arts, and crafts. Singh,
supra note 20, at 7.
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If the allocation of labor remains controlled by government, new
companies will have a difficult time attracting the necessary pool
of talent. Similarly, state-owned enterprises converting into
limited liability companies will have a difficult time ridding
themselves of their excess labor force.
If price controls remain in place, an innovative enterprise will not
have the incentive to spend money and resources developing new
and better products. Similarly, if raw materials remain
subsidized, the enterprise cannot accurately determine its true
profitability.
If capital funding is not competitively based but remains based
on government allocation, efficient enterprises may not get
necessary capital while inefficient ones continue to be
subsidized.
* If each decision to expand or merge is not based on economic
efficiency but rather based on political/bureaucratic lines of
power, then economies of scale cannot be achieved.
If the population is not educated about the reasons for investment
and investment returns are limited by restrictive dividend
policies, restriction on the transferability of shares, onerous
reserve fund requirements, and no legal protection from fraud,
the pool of investors will remain limited.
If bureaucrats insist on exercising their powers over shareholder
board or supervisory committees as granted under the Company
Law, and ignore the advice of professional management,
enterprises under their care will operate under the old system
without any move towards market efficiency.
Clearly, China cannot simply legislate capitalism. It must instead
provide the necessary ingredients for a market economy to flourish. To
further this transformation to a more market oriented economy, the Chinese
government must relinquish more control. While the following measures
may be difficult because they require the government to relinquish some
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control, they are necessary for the ultimate development and well-being of
China.
China can gradually eliminate price control or restrict price
control to only the most scarce and vital commodities. This
would give enterprises the ability to accurately predict their cost
of goods and price goods accordingly. Chinese products would
then be sold competitively, with the quality of goods and services
reflected in their prices and with the demand for goods
determined by the market. These changes do not require that the
Chinese government end all price control, but to the extent that
goods undergo significant processing, the elimination of price
control would allow goods to be sold at prices closer to their
"true" value.
200
China needs to free up its labor assignment system. Obviously,
with a population of over one billion, job placement cannot be
instantly transformed into a market system of free choice.
However, close matching of the individual's training with job
requirements would be a good first step. Mobility after initial
placement should also be encouraged. True mobility, however,
is unlikely to occur until China implements a social security
system which provides unemployment and retirement benefits
that are not controlled by employers. Enterprises should be
encouraged to shatter the iron rice bowl. Pay and promotion
should be based on merit.
Political interference in management decisions must be
eliminated or reduced as much as possible. Efficient
management decisions cannot be made if managers are
constantly in fear of being second guessed by bureaucrats who
200 Elimination of price controls would, generally, cause inflation. Usually, in economies which
have engaged in prolonged periods of price control, there has been artificial depression of the prices. (For
a few goods, this concept may have been the reverse.) Along with price decontrol, the assumption is also
that government subsidy of other inputs, such as energy and labor, would be reduced; thereby placing more
inflationary pressure on the economy. For a discussion of the economic implementation of price decontrol
see Kazimierz Laski, Transition from Command to Market Economies in Central and Eastern Europe:
First Experiences and Questions, in THE TRANSITION FROM COMMAND TO MARKET ECONOMIES IN EAST-
CENTRAL EUROPE 37-40 (Sandor Richter ed., 1992).
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consider political rather than economic consequences of every
decision.
" Banks and other sources of capital must also be freed from
political pressure. Decisions to invest or lend money must be
based on business plans and not on political agendas. This is the
one way in which capital allocation will benefit the efficient
enterprises.
* China must eliminate inefficient enterprises by enforcement of
bankruptcy statutes.
20 1
Without these changes, the enterprises operating under the Company
Law will be saddled with excess labor allocations based on past practices,
price structures reminiscent of the old system, outmoded technology, and
outdated management concepts. These steps may not be easy for a
government facing political challenges in the post-Deng era. However, the
China's leaders should bear in mind that while regressing to a planned
economy may allow for temporary control, ultimately it is a formula for
losing power. Having tasted the benefits of marketization on a limited
scale, the Chinese people are unlikely to willingly relinquish their economic
gains.
Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to a successful transformation of
the Chinese economy is whether political reform can keep pace with
economic reform. If there is significant retrenchment of economic growth
due to ideological or political struggle in a succession bid, the stability and
prosperity of the economy will be in genuine doubt. On the other hand, if
the post-Deng succession is accomplished with all of the participants
focused on retaining past gains, then China's future will remain bright and
the promise of becoming one of the world's greatest economies will be
within reach.
201 Although the Company Law recognizes the possibility of bankruptcy, it does not specify what
constitutes bankruptcy except as the "inability to pay its debts when due." COMPANY LAW, supra note 5
art. 189. While China does have a set of Bankruptcy Rules in the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation), reprinted in CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. (CCH Austl.) § 13-
522 (1986), there have only been a few hundred cases of bankruptcy since the Rules were adopted and
even fewer by state-owned enterprises. Carrie Lee, Bankruptcy Rules Need Overhaul, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jul. 2, 1994, at 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
China's Company Law takes a giant step forward by recognizing
private ownership and the need for structural and organization change at the
enterprise level. However, it does not go far enough to allow these newly
formed companies the ability and the incentive to operate independently and
make economically efficient decisions. So long as the great majority of the
Chinese economy and its bureaucracy operate in a socialist mode, the new
enterprises formed under the Company Law will not be able to make
decisions based entirely on market factors.
For China to fully enjoy the fruits of marketization, it must allow
companies to operate as independent economic units able to make decisions
based on the well-being of the company, rather than other, extraneous
factors. The government's role is to ensure the overall welfare of the
society, but when these public policy considerations are manifested by
micro-managing companies through existing bureaucratic lines, the result is
a formula for inefficiency. Chinese companies must be able to make
decisions free from bureaucratic interference. Enterprises must be allowed
to succeed or fail on their own, without government subsidy or interference.
As the enterprises become more experienced at accumulating and
digesting market information, they will make better decisions. Those who
make the right decisions will succeed and others will disappear. The next
critical step for China's transition into a true market economy is to privatize
as much of the government owned enterprises as possible. Only then will
China reap the full benefits of the Company Law. Until privatization
occurs, the best chances of these companies successfully operating in
China's current economy is for the government to exercise maximum
restraint and refrain from interfering at the micro level.
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